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FROM CONTRACT TO STATUS: COLLABORATION AND THE
EVOLUTION OF NOVEL FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS
Elizabeth S. Scott* & Robert E. Scott**

The past decade has witnessed dramatic changes in public attitudes and legal status for
same-sex couples who wish to marry. These changes demonstrate that the legal conception of
the family is no longer limited to traditional marriage. They also raise the possibility that other
relationships—cohabiting couples and their children, voluntary kin groups, multigenerational
groups and polygamists—might gain legal recognition as families. This Article probes the
challenges faced by aspiring families and the means by which they could attain their goal. It
builds on the premise that the state remains committed to social welfare criteria for granting
family status, recognizing as families only those categories of relationships that embody a longterm commitment to mutual care and interdependence and, on that basis, function well to satisfy
members’ dependency needs. Groups aspiring to legal recognition as families must overcome
substantial uncertainties as to whether they meet these criteria if they are to obtain the rights
and obligations of legally recognized families. Uncertainty contributes to a lack of confidence in
the durability and effectiveness of novel relationships on the part of the aspiring family members
themselves, the larger social community and, ultimately, the state. We develop an informal model
to illustrate the nature of these uncertainties, as well as the solutions to the possible obstacles
they create. Using a hypothetical group consisting of two adult men and two adult women in a
polyamorous relationship, we show how legal family status for novel groups can result from an
evolutionary process for overcoming uncertainties that uses collaborative techniques to build
trust and confidence. Collaborative processes have been shown in other settings to be effective
mechanisms for creating trust incrementally and thus appear to offer a way forward for novel
families. We show that the successful movement to achieve marriage rights for LBGT couples
has roughly conformed to the collaborative processes we propose, and the absence of
meaningful collaboration is one factor explaining the stasis that characterizes the status of
unmarried cohabitants. This evidence supports the prediction that the future progress of other
aspiring family groups toward attaining legal status may depend on how well they are able to
engage the collaborative mechanisms that smooth the path from contract to status.



The title, draws on (and challenges) Henry Maine’s famous statement that “the movement of progressive societies
has…been a movement from Status to Contract.” HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 174 (J. Murray, 10th Ed)
See Brian Bix, Private Ordering in Family Law, 23 Hofstra L. Rev. 249, n. 30 (discussing domestic relations
context of Maine’s statement).
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INTRODUCTION

Many contemporary scholars and policy advocates challenge the privileged status of
marriage, arguing that the state should recognize and support other family relationships.1
Historically, this challenge has been based on a feminist critique of marriage as a patriarchal
institution that oppresses women. But the trend toward greater gender equality in the formal
status of husbands and wives has led recently to a more generalized claim that the elevated status
of marriage demeans and unfairly disadvantages other families.2 These arguments have been
influential in the successful movement toward recognition of the marriage rights of same-sex
couples. They apply as well to the (as yet unsatisfied) demands by scholars and advocates that
other family categories based on adult relationships3 – cohabiting couples and their children,
voluntary kin groups,4 polygamists, and multi-generational family groups raising children—
deserve the legal recognition enjoyed by married couples.5
The view that heterosexual marriage should be an exclusive legal status was grounded
traditionally in conventional moral and religious norms. Cohabiting, polygamous and same-sex

1

Often critics argue for the abolition of legal marriage. See MARTHA FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE
SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1996) (challenging the privileged status of marriage
and arguing that marital privilege should be transferred to families based on caretaker and dependent); NANCY
POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW (2008) (arguing that
privileging marriage harms other families); JUDITH STACEY, UNHITCHED: LOVE, MARRIAGE AND FAMILY VALUES
FROM WEST HOLLYWOOD TO WESTERN CHINA (2011)(arguing that marriage should be abolished and a diverse range
of families recognized because marriage is declining and family diversity dominates ). See also Mark Goldfeder, It’s
Time to Reconsider Polygamy, CNN Opinion, 12\16\2013 at http://cnn.com/2013/12/16/opinion/goldfederpolygamy-laws (advocating legalization). A Canadian commission argued for legal protection of a broad range of
families. Law Commission of Canada, Beyond Conjugality ; Recognizing and Supporting Close Personal Adult
Relationships (2001).
2
Suzanne Goldberg, Why Marriage?, in MARRIAGE AT THE CROSSROADS: THE BRAVE NEW WORLD OF TWENTIFIRST CENTURY FAMILIES 224 (M. GARRISON & E. SCOTT, EDS. 2012) (arguing that the argument against marriage as
a privileged legal status has shifted to one focused on the harm to non-marital families; Judith Stacey, supra note 1 at
8-15. (advocating diversity and challenging feminist opposition to polygamy).
3
We assume that a parent raising a child alone constitutes a family that warrants societal support and resources, but
our focus is on families based on adult relationships: For our purposes, “families” are relationships that warrant a
special legal status based on their perceived social value in satisfying dependency needs. See text accompanying
notes _ to _ infra.The qualities of family relationships is discussed in Part I infra at _
4
Voluntary kin groups are often described as families of choice; family relationships developed by parties without
blood or legal ties, Dawn Braithwaite, et al., Constructing Family: A Typology of Voluntary Kin, 27 (3) J. Soc. &
Pers. Rel. 388 (2010)(describing types and functions of voluntary kin relationships). See discussion in Part IIIC2
infra.
5
See note 1 supra.
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unions were considered illicit and therefore undeserving of legal protection.6 As contemporary
moral norms have evolved, however, the historic justification for this exclusive legal status has
weakened. Recent surveys by the Pew Foundation and other polling organizations show growing
public acceptance of cohabitation relationships as well as same-sex unions.7 Some observers
suggest that even polygamous relationships are becoming “normalized,” pointing to the
popularity of the television series’ Big Love and Sister Wives.8 Although social acceptance of a
broader range of intimate relationships need not result in their recognition by the state as legal
families, it is clear that religious and moral sanctioning of non-traditional families has
diminished, lowering a barrier to societal recognition of novel family groups.
The transformation in social attitudes creates the possibility of a legal regime that fosters
pluralism, allowing individuals to pursue their own vision of the good life in forming family
relationships. On this view, fundamental notions of autonomy and fairness support the claim that
the liberal state should offer individuals the freedom to undertake whatever family relationships
maximize their utility and then should support those families equally.9 From a social welfare
perspective, however, personal satisfaction is not the sole basis for conferring family status. 10
Families serve the critically important functions of raising children, caring for elderly persons
and otherwise satisfying society’s dependency needs. Only relationships that fulfill those
functions adequately are likely to attain legal status as families. But a puzzle that remains: Why,
in an era of social tolerance, have novel family categories,11 with the exception of gays and
6

See discussion of this trend in Marvin v Marvin, 557 P2d. 106 (Cal. 1976)(holding contracts between cohabitants
enforceable). See also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)(striking down criminal sodomy law). However,
moral norms against illicit sexual relationships do not explain why non-conjugal relationships failed to qualify as
family relationships. See discussion in Part IIIC2, infra at ---.
7
Pew Research Center, The Decline of Marriage and Rise of New Families, at 1.
http://www.pewresearch.org/pubs/1802/decline-marriage-rise-new-families (hereinafter The Decline of Marriage).
8
Goldfeder, supra note 1. Adrienne Davis, Regulating Polygamy: Intimacy, Default Rules and Bargaining for
Equality, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 1955 (2010) (suggesting how regulation based on a partnership model could
normalize polygamous relationships). Big Love, which ran for 5 seasons from 2006-201, was nominated for Emmy
and Golden Globe awards. http://www.hbo.com/big-love#/big-love/about/index.html. See discussion of polygamy
in Part IIIC1, infra.
9
The autonomy norm suggests, for example, that the state might provide a menu of family forms from which
individuals could choose the option best suited to their needs. Shahar Lifschitz, Married Against their Will? Toward
a Pluralist Regulation of Spousal Relationships, 66 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1535 (2010)(arguing for family pluralism
as an intrinsic value and challenging the imposition of mandatory obligations on cohabitants)(discussing the intrinsic
value of pluralism as allowing individuals to make life choices ); William Eskridge Jr., Family Law Pluralism: The
Guided Choice Regime of Menus, Default Rules and Override Rules, 100 Geo. L.J. 1881 (2012).
10
See discussion in Part I infra at _.
11
Our analysis of the path to legal recognition focuses on novel family categories (not individual novel families)
primarily because we predict this is the course regulators are likely to take. As with marriage, once a category is
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lesbians seeking marriage rights, failed to attain legal recognition? The answer to this question
turns on the effects of substantial uncertainties that impede the pathway to legal status for novel
family forms.
This Article develops an informal model to illustrate those uncertainties as well as
solutions to the possible obstacles they create. The uncertainties begin with questions the parties
themselves will have about the viability of their novel relationship, but also including public
ambivalence and the skepticism of lawmakers about the quality of the novel group’s
relationships. The discrete challenges facing an aspiring family are a function of three conditions
that we label novelty, social isolation and non-verifiability. We describe a hypothetical group
consisting of two adult men and two adult women in a polyamorous relationship who are initially
uncertain whether their family form can succeed in maintaining a long-term commitment to
mutual care, interdependency and formal equality. In addition, even as a few such successful
families evolve, at first they are likely to be socially isolated, lacking the necessary affiliations
with each other to form a mutually supportive normative community and to pursue their goals of
public acceptance and legal recognition. Finally, our aspiring families face regulatory
uncertainty: the state will lack the information needed to verify the acceptable functioning of the
novel class as a precondition to licensing individual families.
Uncertainty in each of these dimensions contributes to a lack of confidence in the
durability and effectiveness of novel relationships to adequately fulfill family functions on the
part of the aspiring family members themselves, the larger social community and, ultimately, the
state. Yet, high levels of uncertainty have been resolved successfully in other contexts through a
process of collaboration in which trust in the relationship and confidence in a successful outcome
develops incrementally. This raises the question whether collaborative processes can also address
the conditions that impede the legal recognition of aspiring families. Here we draw on
successful collaborations in commercial settings to describe in a stylized manner an
evolutionary, multi-stage process through which the novel group can obtain the rights and
obligations of legally recognized families.12 Initially, by forming collaborative agreements, the

recognized, individuals seeking to register their relationships may be subject to administrative requirements, but not
to inquiry about whether their relationship satisfies the criteria discussed in the text.
12
The stages are presented as distinct but, as we discuss in Part IIIA, they are likely to overlap substantially.
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parties can build trust and confidence in both the quality and durability of their relationships.13
Further, by affiliating in networks, isolated novel families can build a normative community that
can provide support, facilitate social awareness and acceptance, and overcome political obstacles
to attaining their legal objective.14 Finally, through an iterative process, the state can develop
confidence in the capacities of the novel family category to fulfill family functions.15
The model sheds light on both the success and failure of two contemporary aspiring
family groups in securing legal protection for their relationships. First, it illuminates the process
through which same-sex couples have attained marriage rights.16 We show how these couples
seeking official recognition of their families faced the uncertainties we describe and argue that
the movement toward marriage equality has roughly tracked the evolutionary process we model.
In the early period, despite public opprobrium, same-sex couples entered committed
relationships, that were often maintained secretly.17 But the AIDS crisis and the lesbian baby
boom clarified the vulnerability of these family relationships,18 spurring the formation of a
powerful normative community and a network of advocacy groups aimed at gaining public
acceptance and legal protection.19 Legal recognition of family status has then proceeded through
an iterative process as regulators and the public have gained confidence in the quality of
committed same-sex relationships. Second, the model suggests why cohabitation relationships
as a class have failed to attain protected family status.20 Here the sorting problem is acute
because cohabiting couples are a heterogeneous category with diverse goals and expectations for

13

See Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Braiding: The Interaction of Formal and Informal
Contracting in Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 1377, 1405–10 (2010) and discussion in Part
IIB(2) infra.
14
See Walter W. Powell, Neither Market nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization, 12 Res. Org. Beh. 2905
(1990) and discussion in Part IIB (3) infra.
15
See Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Contract and Innovation: The Limited Role of
Generalist Courts in the Evolution of Novel Contractual Forms, 88 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 170 (2013) and discussion in
Part IIB (4) infra.
16
See discussion in Part IIIA infra.
17
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Democracy, Kulturkampf, and the Apartheid of the Closet, 50 Vand. L. Rev. 419, 441
(1997).
18
GEORGE CHAUNCEY, WHY MARRIAGE? THE HISTORY SHAPING TODAY'S DEBATE OVER GAY EQUALITY 96–111
(2004) (arguing for significance of HIV/AIDS and assisted reproductive technology as key factors in push for samesex marriage).
19
This movement included an effective strategy of signaling to the broader society the marriage-like nature of the
gay and lesbian affiliations. See discussion in Part IIIA infra.
20
See discussion in Part IIIB infra. Cohabitants have struggled to establish claims for support and property rights
despite law reform efforts. See Marvin, supra note 5; ALI, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION,
Domestic Partners, 907-944 (2000)(creating and enforcing financial obligations between unmarried cohabitants).
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their relationships. This heterogeneity, together with the defining decision not to marry, impedes
the creation of networks and sends a confusing signal about the nature of cohabiting unions.21
Moreover, the state has not found an effective means of distinguishing those cohabiting partners
who are committed to assuming long term family obligations from others who are not.
Finally, the model predicts the course (though not the success) of other novel families
seeking legal recognition. Individuals in polyamorous, multigenerational, and voluntary kin
groups may perform family functions and aspire to the legal status of established families.22 In
our society, these groups are truly novel in the sense that they are not dyadic unions modeled on
marriage. They face the uncertainties of novelty, isolation and non-verifiability to varying
degrees and, in order to succeed, each group must overcome its own set of challenges. For
example, like same-sex couples, polyamorous groups are likely to confront public hostility, but
they also face the challenge of creating and enforcing understandings among multiple parties
sufficient to sustain well-functioning families. Voluntary kin groups are diverse and face the
challenges created by heterogeneity. In each case, the model suggests the impediments to legal
recognition and how they might overcome through the various collaborative processes we
describe.
At the outset, it may be helpful to make a few clarifying points. Our approach to the issues
we address in the Article is primarily descriptive and predictive, rather than normative. We
recognize that American law places primary responsibility for satisfying dependency needs on
private families and assume that this “neo-liberal” approach is likely to continue.23 On our view,
the assumption of greater responsibility for dependency by the state would enhance social
welfare, but the Article does not directly address this important policy issue. We also assume
that families based on marriage likely will continue to enjoy broad public support and a
privileged legal status, and to be viewed as embodying qualities associated with satisfactory

21

Some cohabitants are in marriage-like unions while others cohabit specifically to avoid family obligations. See
discussion in Part IIIB infra.
22
See discussion in Part IIIC infra.
23
Anne Alstott, Neo-Liberalism in U.S. Family Law: Negative Liberty and Laissez Faire Markets in the Minimal
State, at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2459972 , June 2014 (challenging this approach); See
generally MARTHA FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY (2004) (arguing for collective
responsibility for dependency); MAXINE EICHNER, THE SUPPORTIVE STATE: FAMILIES , GOVERNMENT AND
AMERICA’S POLITICAL IDEALS (2010)(arguing that modern liberal theory discounts families and offers too narrow a
conception of the government’s responsibility for dependency).
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family functioning. Our goal is to explore under what conditions and through what mechanisms
other family categories that embody those qualities could attain a similar status.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes demographic changes in American
families and in public attitudes over the past half century that have created the possibility that
other family forms could be accorded the legal status and resources that marriage enjoys. After
describing the useful social functions of families, we argue that marriage is likely to continue to
qualify for special treatment, but that other groups successfully performing family functions can
also aspire to similar recognition.
Part II develops an informal model that describes predictable obstacles to legal
recognition and a multi-stage collaborative process by which a hypothetical aspiring family
might overcome these obstacles. Successful collaborations mature into contracts for mutual care
and support with enforceable obligations that define relationships in terms of the maintenance of
family functions. As these commitments become widely observable, a collaborative network
forms among aspiring families: A set of emerging social norms reinforces the stability of those
relationships and the families and their leaders signal the quality of their relationships to the
larger society, increasing awareness and acceptance. Ultimately, the state verifies that family
functions are performed adequately and extends formal recognition through a collaborative
process that certifies the novel family category.
In Part III, we first show that the still-evolving process that has led a growing number of
states to grant marriage rights to gays and lesbians is consistent with the predictions of the
collaborative approach. We then turn to cohabitation and explain how the model developed in
Part II sheds light on the failure of cohabitants to gain substantial legal protection. Finally, we
examine the unique uncertainties facing other novel families including polygamous and
voluntary kin relationships, and briefly address the question of legal recognition for groups
assuming more limited family obligations. We conclude that collaborative processes designed to
build confidence and trust between the family members and with others (including the state)
offers these and other aspiring families the means to resolve uncertainty and ultimately attain
legal recognition.

7

I. MARRIAGE AND THE SPECIAL LEGAL STATUS OF FAMILIES
As the public has increasingly come to accept non-marital families, the claim of marriage
critics that the law should recognize and support a broader range of families has become more
compelling. In this Part, we briefly sketch these social changes, and then explore the key social
functions of families and the qualities of relationships that perform these functions well and are
likely to qualify for legal recognition. We examine privileges, benefits and obligations that
currently are assigned to marriage, and predict that, although many contemporary marriages fall
short, marriage as a category is likely to continue to provide the template for well-functioning
families for the public and lawmakers alike. Our analysis also leads us to conclude that other
relationship categories that function satisfactorily to fulfill family functions qualify to receive the
same level of support and societal resources.
A. FAMILY CHANGE AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL ATTITUDES
The question that our article addresses-- under what conditions and through what means
might the law recognize novel families-- is the subject of serious discussion only because of
dramatic changes in family demographics and social attitudes over the past half century. Until
the 1960s, both the law and entrenched social norms prescribed heterosexual marriage defined by
ascribed gender roles as the only acceptable family form.24 Much has changed since that time.
To begin, the proportion of families based on marriage has declined. A recent Pew survey found
that barely 50% of American adults were married, the lowest rate ever reported.25 Meanwhile,
the percentage of couples living together in non-marital unions has increased steadily, as have
the number of children born to unmarried mothers, often cohabiting (at birth) with their
children’s fathers.26 As a result of the increase in non-marital families and their relative
instability (and also higher divorce rates among married couples), more children live in families
that include their mothers, new partners and step and half siblings. Gay and lesbian couples also
24

See generally Marsha Garrison & Elizabeth Scott. Legal Regulation of Twenty-First Century Families, in
GARRISON AND SCOTT, MARRIAGE AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 2 at 303.
25
Pew Research Center, Barely Half of U.S. Adults are Married-A New Low (2011), at
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2011/12/14/barely-half-of-us-adults-are-married-arecord-low/?src=prc-headline.
26
The most comprehensive research on children in unmarried families is the ongoing longitudinal Fragile Families
Study, conducted by Sara McLanahan and her colleagues. See e.g. Sara McLanahan and Christine Percheski,
Family Structure and the Reproduction of Inequality, 34 Annual Rev. Sociology 257 (2008) (reporting 50% of nonmarital parents living together at child’s birth); Sara McLanahan and Irwin Garfinkel, Fragile Families: Debates,
Facts and Solutions, IN GARRISON AND SCOTT, MARRIAGE AT THE CROSSROADS, at 151.
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live together and raise children in a way that was uncommon fifty years ago. And as the
traditional nuclear family has become less prevalent, multi-generational groups in which
grandparents assist with childcare and adult children care for their parents have taken on new
importance.27 Less often highlighted but also a part of the picture of family diversity in the early
21st century are other non-conjugal families made up of relatives or groups of unrelated adults,
sometimes called voluntary kin.28
The factors contributing to these demographic changes have been much discussed and are
not of central importance to our analysis.29 What is important is the generally tolerant public
response to these social developments. Recent polls indicate that most adults in this country have
positive or at least neutral views about a broad range of families, expressing accepting attitudes
toward non-marital couples with (and without) children and same sex couples.30 In many states, a
majority of citizens endorse same-sex marriage.31 Younger adults are more accepting of nonmarital families than their elders,32 suggesting that attitudes may become increasingly tolerant
over time. In a 2010 poll, only unmarried women having children without a partner met with
respondents’ disapproval.33
This account oversimplifies somewhat how the public views novel intimate relationships.
To be sure, tolerance does not extend to all relationships. Polygamy, for example, continues to
be subject to public censure; fundamentalist Mormons and other religious-based groups
practicing polygamy have generally been viewed as pathological, arousing public alarm about

27

The Supreme Court has acknowledged the importance of grandparents in children’s lives. Troxel v. Granville, 530
U.S. 57 (2000)(holding that parents’ objection to grandparent visitation must be given substantial weight, but
declining to hold grandparent visitation statute unconstitutional).
28
For a general discussion of the diversity of modern American families, see Natalie Angier, The Changing
American Family, N.Y.Times, 11/26/2013 at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/26/health/families.html?_r=0 t. See
also Braithwaite, et.al., supra note 4_(study of voluntary kin).
29
See discussion in Angier, id. Contributing factors to family change include the sexual revolution, availability of
birth control, the decline in religious observance, the women’s equality movement, etc.
30
Pew, The Decline of Marriage, supra note ---.
31
Pew Research Center, Changing Attitudes on Gay Marriage, March 12, 2014, at 4.
http://www.pewforum.org/topics/gay-marriage-and-homosexuality. A large minority of states recognize same sex
marriage (hereinafter Changing Attitudes). See National Center of State Legislatures, Defending Marriage: State
Defense of Marriage Laws and Same Sex Marriage at http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/same-sexmarriage-overview.aspx#.
32
Pew, Changing Attitudes, id. at 6.
33
Pew, The Decline of Marriage, supra note ---.
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the sexual coercion of young girls.34 Certainly less controversial, but also less familiar, are nonconjugal voluntary kin groups, which thus far have attracted little public or political attention.35
Nonetheless, the recent demographic changes, together with more accepting public attitudes
toward a range of families, raise the possibility that other groups besides married couples might
gain legal recognition as families.
B. THE QUALITIES OF WELL-FUNCTIONING FAMILIES
Given that our project is to explore whether novel family categories might attain legal
recognition, we must answer a threshold question: Why are families so special and what are the
qualities of adult relationships that are likely to function adequately as families?
We start with the observation that in contemporary society, a broad public consensus
supports the proposition that (at least some) family relationships have substantial social value
and should enjoy a special legal status. The reasons for this consensus are straightforward. As
many scholars have noted, families do the important work of satisfying society’s dependency
needs.36 Families care for dependent children, prepare them for citizenship and educate them to
be productive members of society.37 Families also assume responsibility for responding to
members’ physical and emotional needs created by illnesses, disabilities, old age and the
ordinary stresses of life.38 Not every family provides necessary or adequate care to its dependent
members, of course, but collectively families perform an extraordinarily valuable social function.
The state assists families in performing these functions by providing key services and financial
34

A recent Gallup poll found that 86% found polygamy to be morally wrong. Frank Newport and Igor Himelfarb,
In U.S., Record High Say Gay, Lesbian Relations Morally Okay, Gallup Politics at 2.
http://www.gallup.com/poll/162689/record-high-say-gay-lesbian-relations-morally.aspx. Elizabeth Emens describes
the hostility to polygamy generated by opponents to gay marriage, Elizabeth Emens, Monogamy’s Law, Compulsory
Monogamy and Polyamorous Existence, 29 N.Y.U Rev. L. & Soc. Change 277, 277-284 (2004-05) (hereinafter
Monogamy’s Law). For discussion of public attitudes toward polygamy, see text accompanying notes – to -- infra.
35
Scholars and law reform groups have shown some interest. See Law Commission of Canada, supra note 1. See
also text accompanying notes – to – infra.
36
See FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 1.
37
See Elizabeth Scott, Parental Autonomy and Children’s Welfare, 11 Wm & Mary Bill of Rts. J. 1071 (2003). In
an earlier article, we described the valuable societal service parents provide and argued that autonomy and state
support of parenting is a quid pro quo for parents’ assuming responsibilities for raising and educating their
children—functions that would otherwise be borne collectively. See Elizabeth Scott & Robert Scott, Parents as
Fiduciaries 81 V. L. Rev. 2401(1995). See also Linda McClain, Care as a Public Value: Linking Responsibility,
Resources and Republicanism, 76 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 1673, 1677 (2001).
38
FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH, supra note 24 at 15-19. In some families, of course, adult members may
undertake specialized roles in performing these functions, with some performing direct caretaking services and
others providing financial resources that indirectly support caretaking.
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subsidies,39 by recognizing intimate family bonds, and by defining family rights and
obligations.40 Family members performing their roles responsibly save societal resources that
otherwise would be expended in providing adequate care for children and for elderly and
disabled persons.41 Even if the state were to assume a far greater responsibility for satisfying
society’s dependency needs as many reformers have advocated, families would continue to play
a critical role.42
Many individuals and groups may assume the burden of caring for others, but not all will
attain legal recognition as families. Biological relationship is neither a necessary nor a sufficient
condition for protected legal status.43 The nephew who resides with his aunt and uncle while
attending college and assists with babysitting is not in a “family” relationship that is
acknowledged by law—though his co-residents are.44 What then are the qualities that identify
adult affiliations as family relationships? On our view, a contemporary family that is based on
adult relationships embodies several key attributes: a demonstrated commitment to a long-term
emotionally intimate affiliation in which the parties usually live together in a relationship of
relative equality, the assumption of responsibility for mutual care (and the care of children or
other dependent family members), financial interdependence, and the understanding that
members’ welfare is prioritized above that of others.45 Family bonds are built on trust that
enables each member to rely on others to fulfill their roles and to “be there” in good times and

39

Government services that assist families in raising children and caring for dependency includes free public
schools, subsidized day care, TANF subsidies, nutrition programs, Medicaid and social security spousal and
survivor benefits. See CURRIE, supra note _ (discussing safety net programs). See also CLARE HUNTINGTON,
FLOURISHING FAMILIES: HOW LAW UNDERMINES FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS (2014)(critiquing current policy as
inadequate and proposing how law could fully support families).]
40
The state recognizes family bonds in guardianship law, in the duty to rescue children and spouses and in laws
governing intestacy. Divorce regulation of property division and support define financial spousal obligations. See
note -- supra.
41
FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 1 (arguing that the government should support and compensate
families for their critical role in caring for dependency needs) ; FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER as Fiduciaries,
supra note – at -; (describing quid pro quo); see also, Collins, Leib and Markel, supra note - at 1355-56 (describing
how special legal protections of families are compensation for the services families provide, thereby relieving the
state of their cost).
42
Text accompanying note _supra.
43
See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989)(upholding statute denying parental rights unmarried biological
father of child born to married couple).
44
Similarly three young adult cousins likely would not be eligible to rent a house zoned for “single-family”
residences.
45
Some of these traits might be contested but we think our description is consistent with conventional
understandings. Courts evaluating whether de facto relationships constitute family relationships point to these
qualities. See cases discussed in note 88(?) infra.
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bad. The nephew in our example is not in a family relationship with his aunt and uncle because
the co-residency arrangement is time-limited as are any mutual obligations of the parties. The
core qualities we have identified – a demonstrated, long-term commitment and the assumption of
mutual care and financial responsibility -- increase the likelihood that family relationships will
be stable and sustainable and can be relied on to fulfill the important functions of satisfying
dependency needs.
C. MARRIAGE AS AN ENDURING FAMILY FORM
Although it would seem that other groups that embody the qualities of well-functioning
families might qualify for legal recognition and protection, marriage continues to be the sole
legal family accorded full legal protection. In this section we describe the legal attributes of
marriage that aspiring families do not (but might wish to) enjoy. We then briefly review the
critiques of contemporary law by scholars and advocates, many of whom challenge the continued
utility of marriage. We conclude that despite its deficiencies, marriage seems likely to retain its
protected status; this is so because lawmakers and the public continue to view marriage as a
relatively well functioning family form, a view with some empirical support.
1. Contemporary Marriage as a Privileged Status
Marriage is a relationship defined by legal rights and obligations that do not apply to
other families.46 Marriage confers tangible financial benefits and privileges, including social
security survivor benefits, estate tax exclusions, health insurance benefits for government
employees, as well as special status under residential zoning laws and the opportunity to protect
property from creditors.47 Married couples are also granted rights and privileges based on the
presumed closeness of their relationship, such as surrogate decisionmaking authority and
46

The General Accounting Office famously reported more than 1000 references to marital status in the United States
Code, many of which conferred benefits on married couples that other families do not enjoy. U.S. Government
Accounting Office, Defense of Marriage Act (Publ. No. GAO-OGG-97-16, 1/31/1996 at
http://w/archives/1997og97016.pdf
47
Perhaps the most comprehensive accounts have been offered by advocates seeking marriage rights for gays and
lesbians and by courts holding that their exclusion violates the principle of equal protection. See Goodrich v. Dep’t
of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 355-57 (2003) at _ (cataloguing marital rights and privileges under
Massachusetts law); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (2009)(same under Iowa law). See also Nicole Berg,
Designated Beneficiary Agreements: A Step in the Right Direction for Unmarried Couples, 2011 U. Ill. L. Rev. 267
(discussing marital benefits). See discussion in JESSE DUKEMINIER, JAMES KRIER, GREGORY ALEXANDER &
MICHAEL SCHILL, PROPERTY (8TH ED.) (2014) at 321 (discussing creditor protection dimensions of property acquired
by spouses as tenants by the entireties.
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inheritance rights.48 Further, as LGBT advocates have argued, marriage as a legally privileged
family form carries intangible value beyond its tangible benefits.49 Married couples also have
legal obligations to one another that are not imposed on members of non-marital families. By
virtue of marital status, spouses cannot unilaterally disinherit one another,50 and under property
distribution laws applied at divorce,51 each spouse has a right to share in earnings and property
acquired during the marriage by the other.52
To be sure, non-marital families are not deprived of all legal and constitutional rights.53
But these groups are disadvantaged as compared to families based on marriage in many ways
that can undermine their functioning. Adults in self-identified families can contractually assume
financial obligations to one another but otherwise no familial rights or duties inhere in their
relationships.54 Moreover, these relationships receive little support or recognition from the state;
they do not receive social security spousal benefits, estate tax advantages, inheritance rights, or
(usually) health insurance benefits.55 Further, although the parent-child relationship receives

48

See Berg, id. at --. .
In states that recognized civil union status for gay couples (replicating most marital rights), the emphasis shifted
from tangible rights to the dignitary harm of exclusion. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d. 921 (2010)
(finding Proposition 8 prohibiting same sex marriage unconstitutional, despite availability of civil unions)
50
See DUKEMINIER ET. AL, id. at 384-386.
51
See generally discussion of marital property rights and division on divorce IN IRA ELLMAN, ET. AL., FAMILY LAW:
CASES, TEXTS, PROBLEMS 317- 350 (5TH ED. 2010).
52
Wage-earning spouses may also be subject to a duty to pay alimony. Id. at _. Spouses have a duty to rescue one
another under tort law, whereas a non-marital family member faces no liability for allowing his loved one to starve.
Jennifer Collins, Ethan Lieb & Dan Markel, Punishing Family Status, 1327 B.U. L. Rev. 1327 at 1335 (2008)
(discussing special liability of parents and spouses for failure to rescue).
53
Most importantly, the parent-child relationship receives substantial legal protection, regardless of the marital
status of the parents. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)(parents have constitutionally protected liberty interest
to guide children’s education); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)(same); Yoder v. Wisconsin, 406
U.S. 205 (1972)(state cannot apply mandatory attendance law to Amish children). The Court has also struck down
laws discriminating against children born to unmarried mothers. See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1969)(striking
down statute prohibiting children born to unmarried mothers to sue under the state’s wrongful death statute);.
Unmarried parents receive less protection than their married counterparts. See Michael v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110
(1989) (upholding California statute creating presumption of legitimacy for child born to married mother against
child’s biological father seeking access).
Courts, including the Supreme Court, Sometimes have accorded legal protections to other non-marital
families. Moore v City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977)(finding ordinance definition of family that prohibited
grandson from living with grandparent unconstitutional under Due Process clause). See also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438 (1972)(state law prohibiting unmarried persons from having access to contraceptives violated 14th
Amendment).
54
Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P2d. 106 (Cal. 1976)(holding contracts between cohabitants enforceable).
55
It is not surprising that activists for same sex couples’ relationship rights in response to the AIDS crisis: the
experience of exclusion from family health benefits, medical proxy decision-making authority and guardianship
priority underscored that even long-term committed gay and lesbian relationships received no legal protection. See
Part IIIA, infra. Indeed, until recently, these unions were legally prohibited in many states. See Lawrence v Texas,
49
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substantial legal protection, 56 the relationship between unmarried parents does not.57 The
dependent parent has no claim to alimony or a share of her partner’s property if the relationship
ends even though these financial awards redound to the benefit of the children. Unmarried
parents also have no inheritance rights; children in non-marital families may have to share a
parents’ estate with a more distant relative not living in the household.
Scholars and law reform advocates have sharply criticized the elevated legal status of
traditional marriage and argued for legal protection of other family relationships. The LGBT
marriage equality movement has offered the most prominent and successful challenge, of
course.58 But other reformers have argued that a broad range of non-marital families-- including
single parent families, unmarried couples and their children and adults in non-conjugal
relationships-- should be accorded legal parity with marriage.”59 Finally, a few scholars have
explored the social and legal response to polyamory and tackled the challenge of designing a
regulatory regime for polygamous relationships.60
The contemporary critique has shifted somewhat from the well-established feminist
argument that marriage is a hierarchical, patriarchal institution that oppresses women to a
broader challenge based on principles of liberty, equity and equality.61 Many critics today focus
539 U.S. 558 (2003) (finding criminal anti-sodomy statute unconstitutional as a violation of same-sex consenting
adults’ right of privacy).
56
See note _ supra (discussing protection of parent-child relationship. Further many government programs aim to
provide services to children of unmarried parents in poor families. Medicaid, SCHIP and WIN programs are
federally funded. Many states also have child care programs. For a comprehensive discussion of safety net
programs, see generally JANET CURRIE, THE INVISIBLE SAFETY NET: PROTECTING THE NATION’S POOR FAMILIES
AND CHILDREN (2006).
57
Meryl Weiner, Caregiver Payments and the Obligation to Give Care or Share, 59 Vill. L. Rev. 135 (2014)
(explaining that few financial obligations run between unmarried parents to the detriment of caregivers and arguing
for increasing those obligations for both unmarried or married parents).
58
See generally Stoddard, supra note --. WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, THE CASE FOR SAME SEX MARRIAGE (1996). But see
Franke, Longing for Loving, supra note -- (arguing that after Lawrence v Texas, gays and lesbians should fight to
protect the unregulated territory for relationships between marriage and criminality, an area endangered by
marriage). For a breakdown of state laws, see National Center, supra note _.
59
See generally Nancy Polikoff, Making Marriage Matter Less: The ALI Domestic Partnership Principles are one
Step in the Right Direction, 2004 U. Chi. L. Forum. 353 (expressing approval of the ALI Principles on this ground).
Martha Fineman and Judith Stacy argue for the abolition of marriage. See note 1 supra. See BEYOND CONJUGALITY,
id.
60
See gen. Davis, supra note 7; Elizabeth Lesher, Protecting Poly: Applying the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Nonmonogamous, 22 Law & Sexuality 127 (2013) (developing substantive due process argument for legal
protection of polyamorous relationships); Emens, Monogamy’s Law, supra note --, probes the hostility to
polyamorous relationships and describes non-pathological nature of these relationships .
61
Of course, some feminists continue to reject marriage as harmful to women, emphasizing that married women’s
caretaker\homemaker role often leaves them financially vulnerable on divorce. See Weiner, supra note _ at 135 to
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primarily on the deficiencies of marriage62 and on the harm to non-marital families of privileging
marriage and withholding its benefits from other groups that fulfill family functions.63 Other
scholars argue that the liberal state should support a broad range of family options, allowing
individuals to pursue their conception of the good life.64
A general theme emerges from these critiques: A wide range of diverse families function
(at least) as well as (different sex) marriage and the exclusive legal privileging of marriage can
no longer be justified. The various critiques accept the social value of families, but challenge the
notion that traditional marriage warrants the special status that it has long enjoyed.65
2. The Durability of Marriage as a Family Form
Even though many contemporary marriages do not embody qualities of stability and
mutual care,66 substantial evidence supports that marriage continues to be widely regarded as a

137. But see Goldberg, supra note 2 at 233-34 (pointing to legal reforms that have created formal gender equality in
marriage to challenge argument that marriage by gays would transform the institution).
62
Judith Stacey, for example, derides marriage as a flawed and obsolete institution in an era in which almost half of
marriages dissolve and many spouses (mostly husbands on her account) fail to live up to their vows. See generally
Judith Stacey, Forsaking No Others: Coming to Terms with Family Diversity, in GARRISON AND SCOTT, MARRIAGE
AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 2 at 201
63
See Martha Fineman, supra note 1 (marriage is the key mechanism through which dependency is privatized in
American law). See also POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE, supra note --. Polikoff’s book (and
earlier work) comprehensively argues for protection of all families and documents the harms to non-marital families
under the current regime. She argues that the legal benefits associated with marriage, such as family health
insurance, social security survivor benefits and inheritance rights, are just as important to the welfare unmarried gay
and straight couples, siblings, adult children living with elderly parents and other groups living in long term
relationships. See also Nancy Polikoff, Ending Marriage as We Know It, 32 Hofstra L. Rev. 201 (2003).
64
See Eskridge, Family Law Pluralism, supra note 8 at 1818-1725(arguing for a utilitarian approach of guided
choice to family formation that supports individual flourishing and the value to family members); Shahar Lifschitz,
supra note--. See also Shahar Lifschitz, supra note _(arguing for family pluralism as an intrinsic value and
challenging the imposition of mandatory obligations on cohabitants).
65
A few scholars have questioned the law’s deferential treatment of families. Mary Anne Case, for example,
challenges the assumption that employers, employees and taxpayers should be responsible for substantially
subsidizing parents in their role of raising their children. Mary Anne Case, How High the Apple Pie? A Few
Troubling Questions about Where, Why and How the Burden of Care for Children Should be Shifted, 76 Chi-Kent
L. Rev 1753 (2001). Other scholars have challenged of benefits of family status in the criminal justice system,
criticizing testimonial privilege, sentence reductions and effective immunity from prosecution for harboring a family
member. See Collins, Leib and Markel, supra note --.
66
The relatively high divorce rate in this country varies substantially on the basis of class; it has declined
substantially since the mid-1980s for educated couples, but remained high for working class couples. See JUNE
CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN, MARRIAGE MARKETS: HOW INEQUALITY IS REMAKING THE AMERICAN FAMILY, at15-16
(2014). Spouses can avoid financial interdependence through separate bank accounts and (in many states) property
ownership and premarital agreements. See discussion of marital property ownership in equitable distribution (vs
community property jurisdictions, supra note --.
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well-functioning family form.67 Public attitudes toward marriage are positive;68 most
individuals, even in non-marital families, aspire to marriage.69 Moreover, courts and legislatures
often have invoked marriage as the template for evaluating the claims of parties in non-marital
family relationships that their affiliations should qualify for legal benefits.70 It is not surprising
perhaps that advocates seeking legal protection for these relationships emphasize their similarity
to marriage.71
The empirical evidence as well indicates that families based on marriage, even today,
tend to embody the qualities we have identified as contributing to satisfactory family
functioning. In general, spouses are much more likely to share income and property than are
cohabiting couples.72 Moreover, despite the relatively high divorce rate, marriages tend to be
more stable than informal family relationships; that stability translates into advantages for
children in educational attainment, social adjustment and other measures of well-being.73
67

.

68

See discussion in note _ supra (citing survey that 78% plan to marry).
According to a 2013 Gallup poll, 78% of respondents who had never been married wanted to get married. When
asked why they were not married at the present time, most respondents indicated they hadn’t found the right person,
they were too young/not ready, or they were waiting because of financial considerations. Marriage, GALLUP,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/117328/marriage.aspx#1 (last updated Aug. 1, 2014).
Social scientists find that marriage has become idealized as a marker of financial and personal success and is viewed
as out of reach by many poor and working class individuals. Kathryn Edin has found that both women and men hold
this view. KATHRYN EDIN, DOING THE BEST I CAN (2013); PROMISES I CAN KEEP (2005). See also McLanahan and
Garfinkel, supra note 27 at 151; Andrew Cherlin, The Growing Diversity of Two-Parent Families, id. at 290
70
For a discussion of the use of marriage as a template for family relationships both by lawmakers and advocates in
the marriage equality movement, see Part IIIA infra. Courts also have compared relationships to marriage in
evaluating whether they qualify as “family” relationships. See also Braschi v. Stahl Associates, supra note _.
71
See discussion in text accompanying notes _ to _ infra. The priority assigned by LGBT advocates to attaining
marriage rights for same-sex couples suggests the continued importance of marriage. See Part IIIA infra. This
priority has been controversial in the gay community. Paula Ettelbrick and Thomas Stoddard famously debated
whether marriage should be a key political goal of the gay community. See Thomas Stoddard, Why Gay People
Should Seek the Right to Marry, Outlook, Fall 1989, at 9; Paula Ettelbrick, Since When is Marriage a Path to
Liberation?, Outlook, Fall 1989, at 14. See also Katherine Franke, Longing for Loving, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 2685
(2008)(challenging efforts to gain marriage equality by arguing that same sex relationship are marriage-like).
72
See Michael Pollard and Kathleen Harris, Cohabitation and Marriage Intensity: Consolidation, Intimacy and
Commitment, RAND, Natl Instit. Child Health & Hum Devp’t. (2013). These researchers compared marriage and
cohabitation, using a large data set of young adults . They found that 68% of married couples had joint checking
accounts v. 16% of cohabitants. Marital property is shared on divorce unless the spouses affirmatively opt out
through premarital agreements, an option chosen by only a small percentage of married couples. Heather Mahar,
Why Are There So Few Prenuptial Agreements?, Harvard John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business
Discussion Paper Series, Discussion paper 436, September, 2003, at http://www.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/
(describing studies finding 1.5%, 5%, and 5%-10% of marrying couples have prenuptial agreements).
73
The recent National Survey of Family Growth found that almost half of those cohabitation unions that do not
transition to marriage dissolved within three years. 40 percent of first cohabitation transitioned to marriage by 3
years, 32% remained intact and 27% dissolved. Casey Copen, Kimberley Daniels, & William Mosher, First
Premarital Cohabitation in the United States: 2006-2010 National Survey of Family Growth, Nat’l Health Statistics
69
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Although many factors contribute to the differences, including substantial selection effects, some
of the benefits accruing to marital families inhere simply in the stability of marriage itself. 74
Scholars have argued that the relative stability of marital families in part is a function of
legal and normative influences on the behavior of spouses that support the bond between them.
The formal commitment undertaken by couples entering marriage is not casual; it is typically
involves the ceremonious assumption of mutual obligations.75 Marriage can be set aside only
through the formal legal process of divorce, which even today carries high social and legal
costs.76 But beyond its formal legal structure, marriage is embedded in informal social norms
that prescribe expectations for spousal behavior and underscore its nature as a family relationship
defined by long-term commitment. These norms are internalized, reinforcing trust, and are also
enforced externally through informal sanctions.77 Although the norms regulating marriage

Rep. Center for Disease Control, April 4, 2013 at 5. Get 5 year statistics. Pollard and Harris, supra note _, found
substantially lower levels of commitment between cohabitants than between spouses.
Sara McLanahan and her colleagues n an important longitudinal study, the Fragile Families and Child Well Being
Study, have found that children born to unmarried parents are far less likely to be living with both parents at age five
than those born to married parents. See discussion of study, supra note –
74
More educated and wealthier couples marry are far higher rates than poorer, less educated couples and many of
the differences in outcomes can be attributed to this selection effect. See CAHN AND CARBONE, supra note _ at _. But
not all. See Robert Emery, Erin Horn, and Christopher Beam, Marriage and Improved Well-Being, in Garrison &
Scott, MARRIAGE AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 2 at 126 (using twin study to confirm marital benefits). See also
Deborah Carr and Kristen Springer, Advances in Families and Health: Research in the 21 st Century, J. Marriage &
Fam. 742 (2010)(review of research showing marital benefits). This does not mean, of course, that coercing
unmarried couples to marry would produce stability.
75
For a discussion of the role of wedding ceremonies and traditions such as wedding rings in reinforcing marital
commitment, see Elizabeth Scott, Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86 VA. L. REV. 1901(2000).
See also Elizabeth S. Scott, A World without Marriage, 41 Fam. L. Q. 531 (Fall 2007).
76

Economists Shelly Lundberg and Robert Pollak argue that the high cost of divorce, including the internalized sense
of personal failure, defines marriage as a relationship of inter-temporal commitment and is a key distinction between
marriage and cohabitation. On their view, this commitment facilitates a long term investment in children, a goal that
motivates contemporary marriage. Shelly Lundberg & Robert Pollak , Cohabitation and the Uneven Retreat from
Marriage in the U.S., 1950-2010, September 2013 at NBER Working paper 19413 at
14http://www.nber.org/papers/w19413.
Upon dissolution, the financial obligations undertaken by the spouses usually are legally enforceable. See Elizabeth
Scott & Robert Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 Va. L. Rev. 1225 (1998)(describing through property
distribution on divorce). In community property states, property and income acquired during marriage is community
property. In other states, marital property is subject to equitable distribution on divorce, unless the couple opts out
through a prenuptial agreements. See generally ELLMAN, ET AL., at 317-380 for a discussion of property distribution
on divorce). See also text accompanying note _ infra (discussing small portion of couples executing prenuptial
agreements).
77
Scott, Social Norms, supra note -- (arguing that traditional marriage was regulated by commitment norms and
gender norms, which became bundled, contributing to contemporary criticism of marriage). The couple’s
community sanctions violations through gossip and other expressions of disapproval. Id at 1920-1923.
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function imperfectly in contemporary society,78 they tend to support marital commitment by
guiding spouses’ behavior in ways that strengthen relationships and deter behavior that may have
a destabilizing effect on the relationship.
In sum, marriage occupies a secure status as a legally recognized family with broad
public support. Moreover, although marriage has become both less common and less stable in
modern times, the weight of the evidence is that marriage as a category continues to fulfill
relatively well the functions that justify its protected legal status.
C. EXTENDING STATE BENEFITS TO OTHER FAMILIES
The fact that the law confers deference and societal resources on marriage does not mean
that the privileged status of this traditional family form should be exclusive. In a liberal society,
fundamental principles of autonomy support a state policy that promotes pluralism and provides
opportunities for individuals to form family relationships that bring happiness and satisfy their
needs.79 Moreover, the current social climate makes such a pluralist approach feasible. But
while autonomy values argue for expanding choice beyond traditional legal boundaries, social
welfare concerns predictably will be invoked to justify restricting family status to those
relationships that predictably will fulfill the legitimate state interest in reliably satisfying
dependency needs. Legal privileging of families absorbs resources that are not available for other
social purposes: estate taxes not paid by surviving spouses, for example, are lost to the federal
treasury. Nonetheless, this allocation of resources is justified when an aspiring family group
fulfills the socially valuable functions identified above, thereby relieving the state of part of its
collective obligation to care for dependency. In sum, while not all claimants warrant special
family status, groups that care adequately for members’ dependency needs and have the qualities
of commitment, durability and emotional and financial interdependence deserve legal
recognition and support.
On occasion, lawmakers have acknowledged this point. As we have discussed, legal
benefits are sometimes extended to adult de facto relationships on the basis of their similarity to
78

Id. at 1940. This is so for two reasons: first, the norms themselves are weaker and, second, the greater anonymity
and mobility of urban society dilutes their effectiveness.
79
A pluralist approach allows individuals to pursue their own conceptions of the good life, which for many people
surely includes living in families that satisfy physical and emotional needs. Supra note – (citing articles arguing for
pluralist approach.
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marriage.80 Courts have also recognized de facto parent-child relationships in situations in which
an adult has functioned in a parental role for an extended period in a family setting.81 But
despite general public tolerance of a diverse range of families, the success of gays and lesbians in
gaining access to marriage represents the only discernible trend toward elevating the legal status
of a category of non-traditional family.
This presents a puzzle. In a society in which the public accepts family diversity, and
acknowledges the importance of families to individual and collective welfare, what explains the
legal inertia? Are there particular conditions that impede legal recognition of non-marital
families? The answers to these questions can shed light on why some non-marital families have
failed to obtain legal protection despite more tolerant social attitudes.

II. A COLLABORATIVE MODEL OF THE EVOLUTION OF NOVEL FAMILY
FORMS
In this Part, we seek to explain the legal inertia and to specify a process by which aspiring
family groups might attain their goal. We develop an informal model that describes a multi-stage
collaborative process by which novel family forms can achieve legal status as families. Our analysis
begins with the premise that the state appropriately grants legal privileges and benefits to families
because these groups supply important social goods for which the state would otherwise be
responsible.82 In Part IIA, we show that, owing to the effects of uncertainty about whether novel
family groups satisfy this criterion, the parties face challenging conditions that impede their progress
80

Courts assessing whether some non-marital couples deserve recognition as “families” have evaluated their
relationships against a metric of marital family behavior and attributes—pointing to their durability, history of
financial interdependence, care during illness and intimate companionship. See Braschi v. Stahl Assoc. Co, 543
N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989) (couple qualify as “family” under rent control ordinance based on marriage-like
relationship). See also Connell v. Francisco, 898 P2d. 831 (Wash. 1995)(upholding equitable distribution of
property between cohabitants on basis of marriage-like quality of relationship). See also Douglas NeJaime, Before
Marriage: The Unexplored History of Non-marital Recognition and its Relationship to Marriage, 102 Cal. L. Rev.
87, 113 (2014) (explaining that California advocates for domestic partnership rights in 1990s argued that gay unions
were marriage-like).
81
Many cases involve lesbian de facto parents living with the child and legal (birth) mother. Courts have allowed
visitation rights when petitioners can show they functioned as a parent with the agreement of the parent for an
extended period of time. See e.g. V.C v. M.J.B, 748 A2d 549 (N.J. 2000) (de facto parent had standing to seek
visitation). When the gay couple marries, the spouse becomes the legal parent to children born to the marriage.
82
We do not challenge that historically marital privilege may have had other justifications, but assume that in
contemporary society, the legitimacy of marital privilege is based on its social utility as a family form.
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toward gaining legal recognition as families. In Part IIB, the uncertainty is resolved in the model
through three stages of an integrated process, each of which is defined by a form of collaboration.
Collaborative engagement in the development of novel commercial relationships provides exemplars
of how these impediments have been overcome in other contexts. This analysis illuminates the
mechanisms parties use to make credible commitments to each other, signal those commitments to
others, and engage with the state in verifying their compliance with established norms.
A. CONDITIONS IMPEDING THE LEGAL RECOGNITION OF NOVEL FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS.
We begin with a thought experiment. Consider a group composed of two men and two
women, who have developed close emotional and sexually intimate relationships with one
another and wish to live together as a single family bound by a long term commitment to mutual
support, interdependency and equality.83 They plan to pool their earnings and property and to
have children and care for them collectively. Will this group face conditions that impede their
efforts to secure the rights and obligations currently bestowed on marital families? Our thought
experiment yields the prediction that an aspiring polygamous family84 will confront three
significant obstacles on the path to legal recognition.
The first challenge this group faces is relational uncertainty or novelty: family relationships
such as these are experimental, and even close emotional bonds are not predictive of whether
the group will function well as a family. Lacking models of similar relationships that have
succeeded in forming families, the individual members of the polygamous family will be unsure
whether their affiliation will be durable and whether the trust and confidence that support longterm commitment will develop. A second difficulty inheres in the fact that novelty also implies
idiosyncrasy. In the initial stage, there are few other polygamous families with similar
aspirations with whom to share experiences. Thus, even if they can develop the means to create
the necessary trust in each other’s capabilities, a polygamous family may be socially isolated,
lacking a community of similar aspiring families. The nature of their relationship will also be
83

The commitment of our hypothetical polygamous family to formal equality and mutual support and loyalty
distinguishes this aspiring family from other polygamous groups, such as fundamentalist Mormons, that are
organized hierarchically around a single dominant male figure. See Davis, supra note -- at 1.
84
Polygamy is defined as plural marriage with multiple spouses regardless of the gender combination. Polygyny is
the familiar form of one man and multiple wives. Our group aspires to legal recognition of plural (or polygamous)
marriage. See Emens, Monogamy’s Law, supra note 300-303 (clarifying terms). Polyamorous relationships do not
imply the commitment of family relationships as we have defined them; thus our family is “polygamous.”
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unfamiliar to the public, which may view this novel family with suspicion –and perhaps
hostility.85 This isolation creates a daunting obstacle to recognition at the level of practical
politics, of course,86 but also means that aspiring polygamous families are not (or are only
weakly) integrated into the larger normative community that defines expectations for family
behavior.
A final problem stems from the need to persuade the state to extend legal recognition to
polygamous families as a recognized family form in exchange for their readiness to assume
family responsibilities. The state faces a serious information deficit in evaluating whether this
new category of family has the qualities that justify special legal treatment. This is because
family functioning is largely private and the durability and adequacy of the novel group may be
hard to assess. Thus, state actors face informational barriers in sorting groups deserving of
family status from other groups that may seek the privileges and resources allocated to families
but fail to create the welfare benefits the state requires.87 In the discussion that follows, we
argue that in combination these conditions impose significant obstacles to efforts by a
hypothetical polygamous family to secure legal family status.
1. The Problem of Relational Novelty
To some extent, the problem of novelty is almost universal when adults form family
relationships. Individuals must establish trust in each other’s character and have confidence in
their respective abilities before they can make credible commitments to undertake the demanding
roles required. Although some people report having a love-at-first-sight experience when they
met their future life partners, more typically the process of finding satisfactory and lasting family
relationships is one of experimentation and adjustment. Commitment is usually tentative when
85

The public reaction to polyamorous groups is very likely to be hostile. See survey of public attitudes, supra note_.
Other novel families, such as voluntary kin, may meet skepticism but less animus. See discussion in Part IIIC.
86
We argue in Part IIB3 that the formation of interest group networks is likely to be an important means of
pursuing the goal of legal recognition.
87
A legal status (such as marriage) carrying benefits and privileges carries a moral hazard risk. See Kerry Abrams,
Marriage Fraud, Cal. L. Rev. 1 (2012)(describing government strategies to prevent fraudulent claims to various
marriage benefits). The risk will likely be (and has been) a concern when novel families seek recognition. For
example, when advocates sought domestic partnership status for gay couples in California in the 1990s, insurance
companies’ insisted the status be defined so that only marriage-like couples qualified. The companies feared that
individuals with AIDS would register with sympathetic friends, thereby qualifying for health insurance. See, e.g.,
NeJaime, supra note – at 115 (2014) (explaining that insurance carriers “resisted adding domestic partnership
coverage without assurances that this new relationship status would be characterized by a marriage-like level of
commitment”).
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relationships are new and grows over time unless or until one or both of the parties realizes that
the relationship is unsuccessful. Moreover, the parties may differ in their intentions and
investment in the union. Each hopes that the prospective partner will be a trustworthy and
competent caretaker and that emotional attachments will mature and endure. But only through
experience can parties evaluate accurately whether their relationships embody the qualities that
define successful families.88
The level of uncertainty is significantly greater when individuals, such as those forming a
polygamous family, experiment with novel family forms. Aspiring families are by nature
experimental; the parties lack exemplars to guide them in family behavior and must adapt and
adjust their roles and interactions over time as they seek to fulfill family functions in uncharted
settings.89 Some forms may work better than others to satisfy dependency needs reliably. The
individuals forming a polygamous family, for example, will be uncertain whether multiple adults
in a conjugal group will function effectively to care for one another and their children in stable
committed relationships. Increasing the number of adults beyond a partnership of two individuals
adds complexity to the relationship, and with complexity may come a greater potential for
exploitation, conflict, or alliances within the group—all of which might contribute to
instability.90 Even if these risks are never realized, the evidence of whether a novel family form
is viable can only be acquired through extended experience. Only when the heightened level of
uncertainty is substantially resolved can the parties determine that their polygamous family has
the caring qualities and the enduring character that the social welfare criterion requires.
2. Social Isolation: The Absence of Associational Bonds and Public Acceptance
Even if the adult members of a polygamous family gain confidence and trust in one
another as a functioning family, other challenges remain. In the early period of its evolution, the
isolated novel family typically lacks a community of similar families; this creates two problems.
First the polygamous family must rely solely on its own members’ commitment and resources
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for success. The absence of a broader social group leaves the polygamous family without the
benefit of friends and neighbors who offer support and enforce behavioral norms,91 important
sources of stability for marital families. Moreover, even as their numbers increase, success in the
political arena is unlikely unless polygamous families affiliate and form an interest group (or
groups) dedicated to achieving their shared political goals of attaining legal recognition. Without
such coordination, polygamous families may fulfill family functions well but they are still likely
to retain their outsider status. In short, the novel family faces the challenge of overcoming
isolation and creating a network of families capable of developing group norms and mobilizing
political action to gain support for the group’s legal recognition.92
Successful mobilization poses daunting challenges for novel families.93 Due to
polygamous families’ separation from society, the public initially may be unaware of the group’s
existence and later may find their family relationships to be strange and unfamiliar. Public
awareness is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for legal recognition. But even in an era of
more tolerant public attitudes, growing public awareness may engender skepticism or hostility
based on assumptions that polygamous families will not function adequately as families, or that
they may harm dependent members, or are engaging in immoral behavior.94 Thus, the aspiring
family category faces the challenge of demonstrating to the larger community that they are
faithfully performing family roles, a difficult task given that families function largely in the
private sphere. Further, the anticipation of a hostile public response may inhibit the inclination
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As we discuss below, the creation of a network of aspiring families, may be a key intermediate step in a norm
formation process between a period in which small numbers of families function in isolation and one in which the
novel family group attains some level of public acceptance.
92
Our description of the process is stylized and real isolation likely exists only in the earliest stage. See VERTA
TAYLOR AND NANCY WHITTIER, COLLECTIVE IDENTITY IN SOCIAL MOVEMENT COMMUNITIES: LESBIAN FEMINIST
MOBILIZATION, FRONTIERS IN SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY 104-29 (1992) (“…the purposeful and expressive
disclosure to others of one’s subjective feelings, desires, and experiences – or social identity – for the purpose of
gaining recognition and influence is collective action”).
93
A substantial literature focuses on the role of social movements in advancing legal and constitutional reforms.
Some scholars have analyzed the mobilization and impact of identity-based social movements. See William
Eskridge, Channeling: Identity-based Social Movements and Public Law, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 419 (2001) (describing
the mobilization of the gay rights movement). Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres, CITE. See text accompanying note
_infra for a discussion of social mobilization to attain family rights.
94
The testimony in the Congressional hearings for the Defense of Marriage Act in 1995 was replete with allegations
that gay relationships were immoral, promiscuous, and harmful to children. See e.g. Congressional Rec., Statement
by Cong. Sensenbrenner, July 12, 1996. Today polygamous families face a similar response. See text accompanying
notes -- to -- infra.

23

of these families to publicize their family relationships.95 But if they are “closeted,” polygamous
families will find it more difficult to gain public acceptance as well- functioning families.
Public ignorance or skepticism about the qualities of an aspiring family category
undermines the prospect of legal recognition.96 Although the relationship between public
attitudes and legal reform in the realm of civil rights is complex,97 some level of public tolerance
and receptiveness is (and has been) a predicate to the willingness of political actors and courts to
confer new family rights.98 Moreover, a community of polygamous families that is separated
from the larger society largely lacks the benefit of the normative framework regulating family
behavior that generally stabilizes and supports those families that already enjoy social
recognition.99
3. The Verifiability Problem
Even after polygamous families develop the trust and confidence to sustain their mutual
commitments and affiliate with similar families in pursuit of public acceptance and legal
recognition, the state confronts a severe information problem in verifying the petitioning groups’
family functioning. Predictably not all relationships will qualify for the legal subsidy that is
conferred on families, and even groups that have attained social acceptance may have a relational
95
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form that imposes latent risks on vulnerable members. The state has an independent interest in
determining whether novel family categories seeking recognition function safely and
successfully for all family members, an interest that may require a greater depth of knowledge
than is needed to attain public acceptance.100 Accurate information is particularly important
because legal recognition, once conferred, may be difficult to withdraw. But the inherent
privacy of family functioning poses a classic information problem: state actors making decisions
about conferring family status may have difficulty discerning whether polygamous families as a
category fulfill the functions and possess the qualities that make family relationships socially
valuable.101 Many of the tangible qualities that characterize successful family groups such as
financial interdependence and mutual care involve behaviors that are not readily observable to
third parties. Moreover, intangible qualities that define families, such as long-term commitment,
loyalty and equality are difficult to evaluate in the absence of express promises or reliable
proxies. Thus, distinguishing well-functioning family categories from exploitative or less stable
affiliations poses a challenge for state actors, who may have difficulty getting reliable evidence
about the nature of claimants’ relationships.
B. THE EVOLUTION TOWARD LEGAL RECOGNITION THROUGH COLLABORATION
1. The Elements of Collaborative Behavior.
Our social welfare premise implies that the state will limit legal recognition to those
categories of aspiring families that can overcome the impediments caused by relational novelty,
social isolation and non-verifiability. While the possible means of coping with these conditions
are overlapping and interrelated, for analytical purposes we separate them into three, highly
stylized evolutionary stages: 1) individuals (exemplars of the novel family type) form and
successfully maintain families; 2) the individual exemplars form associational bonds that foster
durable group norms and enable the collective to pursue the acceptance and support of the
community at large; and 3) the state acquires the information about the particular context in
which a novel family type functions to certify its entitlement to legal family status.
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Our model uses exemplars from commercial contexts to show how each of the
uncertainties that impede the recognition of novel family forms can be resolved by processes that
we loosely describe as collaboration. By collaboration we mean a set of behaviors designed to
pursue a common objective that can only be achieved through the combined efforts of more than
one party when the prospect of success cannot be determined until after each party makes
investments in the relationship. Parties who collaborate commit to sharing private information,
adjusting iteratively to the new information acquired from others, and relying on informal norms
as the means of motivating each party to invest in the relationship.102 This technique builds trust
in each party’s commitment to cooperate in pursuing substantive goals as well as confidence in
the ability of the other(s) to perform their undertakings competently.103
Aspiring families, such as our polygamous family, can use collaborative techniques to
respond to each of the three challenging conditions that we have identified. At the first stage,
joint collaborations between (or among) individuals aspiring to form polygamous families builds
the trust and confidence needed to overcome the unique uncertainty caused by relational novelty.
Collaborative agreements interweave formal commitments with informal norms in ways that
respond to the uncertainty inherent in the process of experimentation. At the second stage,
collaboration enables isolated polygamous families to overcome collective action problems and
associate with other similar families in developing group norms and forming networks in pursuit
of their goals of public acceptance. Finally, at the third stage, collaboration between an aspiring
category and the state facilitates joint action to mitigate the risk of harms that otherwise may
impede certification of the family class. At each of these evolutionary stages, the key
collaborative behaviors of information sharing, iterative adjustment and informal enforcement
are common elements.
In the discussion that follows, we show how collaboration in the world of commercial
contracting has facilitated effective responses to the conditions of relational novelty, social
isolation, and non-verifiability. We use these analogies to develop an extended example of how
a novel family form can evolve from individual aspiring families that successfully develop
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mechanisms to ensure mutual care and support for their members, to an associational network
that signals its identity with the larger normative community, and finally to the verification and
certification by the state that members of the successful group are able reliably to fulfill family
functions.
2. Collaborative Contracting as a Means of Coping with Uncertainty.
We begin with this question: How can a polygamous family (of two men and two
women) form a durable family without prior experience with one another or with the family
form, and without normative guidance tailored to the form?104 The parties understand the
functions of families and have general goals for their affiliation. But because of the novelty of
their relationship and the dearth of similar family exemplars, the prospect of a durable
commitment for on-going support, care and nurture is highly uncertain. At the outset none of the
aspiring family members knows whether making an enduring commitment is the best means of
pursuing his or her best interests. For this reason, the parties cannot specify with any confidence
defined obligations that will achieve their goals for the relationship. In short, at the outset there
is not only uncertainty about whether particular individuals can form these durable commitments
but also uncertainty over whether the form itself is one in which the functions of families are
fulfilled satisfactorily.
a. A Commercial Analogue: Collaborative Contracting in an Uncertain World. An
analogue exists in the commercial realm to this vexing problem of relational uncertainty.
Because of the increasing pace of technological development in the contemporary global
environment, commercial actors sometimes need to find partners to share capabilities in pursuing
a project that can only be defined and ultimately developed through their joint efforts.105
Traditional modes of contracting often offer no solution to the contracting problems these parties
confront. Facing these conditions of relational uncertainty, commercial actors innovate,
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searching for partners capable and willing to engage in on-going collaborations.106 These
innovative “collaborative agreements” have become an essential part of doing business in the
contemporary commercial environment.107
In a number of industries characterized by rapid technological development, conditions of
high uncertainty have led to collaborations where both parties’ skills and commitment to
cooperate are necessary to achieve success. 108 In settings as diverse as the pharmaceutical
industry and manufacturing supply chains, parties have come to realize that the feasibility of
many projects can only be determined by joint investment in the production of information to
evaluate whether a project is profitable to pursue.109 An example is the research collaboration
between a large pharmaceutical company with expertise in bringing new drugs to market and a
smaller biotech firm with innovative technology. The collaborative agreement aims to explore
the feasibility of jointly discovering and developing a novel pharmaceutical product.110 The
common feature of these regimes is a commitment to joint exploration without imposing legal
consequences on the outcome of the parties’ collaborative activity other than in conditions of
“bare-faced cheating.”111 Thus, neither party has a right to demand the performance that the
parties imagine may result from a successful collaboration. If the parties cannot ultimately agree
on a final objective, they may abandon the collaboration.112
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b. Key Elements of Collaborative Agreements. The ability of any party to exit the collaboration
raises a central question: What knits the collaborators efforts together? After all, unless the parties can
make credible commitments to invest in the relationship, the project will never get off the ground.
Studies of these commercial collaborations provide answers to this key question.113 In brief, the
collaboration rests on a governance structure that, over time, creates confidence in the capabilities and
trust in the character of the counterparty. Trust and confidence are extremely valuable commodities: not
only do they motivate each party to invest in the relationship but they also make the prospect of
abandoning the relationship in order to collaborate with others much less attractive.114
The governance of these commercial collaborations shares several common elements. The first
element is a commitment to an ongoing mutual exchange of private information designed to determine if
a project is feasible, and if so, how best to implement the parties’ joint objectives. The second
component is a procedure for resolving disputes. Its key feature is a requirement that the collaborators
reach unanimous agreement on crucial decisions, with persistent disagreement resolved by unanimous
agreement at higher levels of management from each firm.115 Together these two mechanisms make
each party’s character traits and substantive capabilities observable and forestall misunderstandings.
Working under conditions of uncertainty, the parties can expect to encounter unanticipated problems
that can only be solved jointly and that may generate occasions of disagreement. Their increasing
knowledge of each other’s capacities and willingness to share private information in service of their
collective goals facilitates the resolution of problems and constrains opportunistic behavior.116
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This arrangement is distinctively limited in its goals, functioning only to allow the parties
to learn about each other’s skills and capabilities for collaborative innovation and to develop
jointly the routines necessary to pursue a desired objective. But, importantly, the collaborative
agreement does not commit either party to develop, supply or purchase any product or service.
Rather, the object is to discover two things about the counterparty: How well does the
counterparty cooperate and how capable are they at working jointly toward the ultimate goal? In
this way, the governance structure provides the environment in which trust and confidence can
grow: in effect, collaborative contracting endogenizes trust by formalizing a process that builds
parties’ confidence in one another and thereafter supports investments in their joint objectives
based on the trust created. The evidence indicates that if the collaborative process is successful,
the uncertainties that existed at the outset of their dealings are resolved through accrued
experience, giving rise to traditional contractual statements of obligation and remedy.117
c. Collaborative Contracting in the Family Context. The collaborative contracting
mechanism is ideal for experimentation in an effort to achieve a goal 1) that none of the parties
can accomplish on his or her own; and 2) where the parties are unwilling, owing to uncertainty
about the viability of the collaboration, to commit in advance to a sustained investment in the
relationship. These two conditions characterize the challenge facing parties desiring to establish
novel family relationships. Consider again a hypothetical polygamous family. As in the
commercial context, these parties face uncertainty about the viability of the venture they aim to
undertake: it is unclear whether this (or any other) polygamous family represents a stable and
enduring model for fulfilling family functions satisfactorily. Moreover, novel relationships such
as this are not supported by strong social norms defining behavioral expectations and
encouraging long-term commitment.
Under those conditions, the goals of this aspiring family can be furthered through
processes that are analogous to the kind of collaborative agreements that have proved useful in
commercial contexts. To be sure, the sources of relational uncertainty are somewhat different
and the form of the agreement among individuals in a novel family group is likely to differ from
117
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the commercial counterparts. A major difference between commercial collaborative contracts
and their nascent familial counterparts, for example, is the form of the governance arrangement
that creates the environment within which trust and confidence can grow.118 In commercial
settings, these structures are specified in formal written documents, while in the familial context
the governance commitments typically arise out of mutual understandings often based on the
parties’ conduct over time. But this distinction does not diminish the significance or utility of
the commitment to collaborate by an aspiring family unit.119
In both the commercial and familial cases, however, the enforceable commitment is
limited at the outset to the obligation to collaborate on efforts to pursue the parties’ mutual
goals.120 A polygamous family commits to pursue an objective—long term mutual care and
support of each other and other dependents in their household -- under circumstances where they
are uncertain about the ultimate success of the relationship (or even the specific form that it may
take). As noted above, the resulting agreement forms the basis for building trust as the
foundation of a committed family. These collaborative agreements do not impose obligations to
share property upon the dissolution of the relationship; the parties’ uncertainty about the success
of the collaboration makes such precise commitments infeasible. What then are the enforceable
obligations of the family aspirants who do commit to collaborate? By analogy to the commercial
context, each party is free to abandon the relationship at any time without facing any legal
consequences. However, the initial commitment implies an enforceable obligation of family
fidelity and loyalty during the period of ongoing collaboration.121 On this basis, evidence that
118
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one of the parties was pursuing another familial relationship during the collaboration or selfishly
appropriating shared resources gives rise to an enforceable claim for the value of any
investments that injured parties have made in reliance on the commitment.122
Family collaborations have both disadvantages and advantages relative to their
commercial counterparts. Family relationships do not lend themselves to the kind of hierarchical
structure that motivates consensus in the business setting, where higher levels of management
review disputes. On the other hand, the co-residency of aspiring-family members and their
ability to monitor one another closely push the parties toward consensus and reinforce the
collaboration in ways that establish trust. Moreover, the personal nature of the information
shared by each party creates the potential for reputational harm if that information is later
disclosed, making abandonment costly.123
Not all collaborative contracts creating familial obligations will be successful; some
parties’ relationships, and perhaps some relationship forms, may simply not develop into stable
interdependent family groups. But in those relationships that do mature, understandings among
the members of the polygamous family will become more complete through accrued experience
as time goes on.124 In this way, the polygamous family will move beyond collaborative
agreements to enforceable understandings about their performance obligations.125 Thus, just as
parties in the pharmaceutical industry undertake formal agreements for drug development on the
basis of information attained during the collaborative contract phase, so a polygamous family in
a collaborative family relationship may reach formal understandings about property sharing,
financial support and obligations for child care. Again, as in the collaborative contract phase,
say, by cheating on the exclusive commitment to care for each other—would only entitle the injured party to recover
her reliance costs as measured by investments to date in the collaboration and any opportunities foregone. For a
commercial example of the kind of cheating on the commitment that creates liability and a discussion of the limited
remedies available, see Medinol Ltd. v. Boston Scientific Corp., 346 F. Supp. 2d 575 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
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these agreements may be understandings implied from conduct based on duration, shared duties
and other objective proxies that arise over time in cohabitation relationships.126
In this first stage of collaboration, the evolutionary process we describe can result in an
aspiring polygamous family bound by (usually implied) contract to provide each member mutual
support and care with provisions for the assignment of responsibilities and for the distribution of
property rights upon termination. Predictably, we would, over time, expect to find a number of
aspiring polygamous families living in committed, contractually based relationships.
3. Moving from Isolated Collaborations to a Socially Integrated Collaborative
Network.
Even as a number of polygamous families establish stable family relationships based on
contract, other challenges remain. How do isolated polygamous families coordinate to overcome
collective action impediments and ultimately become integrated into the larger social
community? The process that leads first to association among polygamous families and then to
integration serves two functions. At a pragmatic level, coordination is necessary for the novel
family to begin the process of pursuing its political goals. Isolated polygamous families are
unlikely to attract public attention, gain acceptance, or effectively communicate their identity as
successful families. The formation of associations among aspiring novel families also facilitates
the development of shared social norms and enables these polygamous families and their agents
to signal collectively their identity with the larger social community.127 Integration into the
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Relational Contract, supra note _ at 1288-93(discussing the role of norms in reinforcing marital commitment).
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broader normative community further reinforces socially approved behavior and the stability of
evolving relationships.128
a. Normative Integration in Common Purpose Communities: The Case of
Collaborative Networks. Again we turn to the commercial context to provide an analogue for
how family aspirants can resolve the problem of social isolation and form a coherent community
with collective goals and shared norms. Commercial parties in particular industries form
networks (or informal alliances) in order to enhance mutual collaboration in an environment
where multi-lateral cooperation produces gains for all members in pursuit of their individual
business ventures.129 These networks are not aided by formal association (although individual
members may execute bi-lateral contracts), but are linked informally by cooperative norms.
Research by organizational sociologists shows how shared norms evolve and successfully
control opportunism and other non-cooperative behaviors in these networks even as new
members join the network and others drop away.130
A business network consists of a number of independent firms that enter a pattern of
collaboration designed to achieve the benefits of cooperation without formal integration.131 Of
particular interest for our example are networks consisting of a cluster of firms whose
membership shifts over time. A useful exemplar is the tech transfer network consisting of a
university/research entity (inventor), a number of biotech companies, large pharmaceutical firms
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and venture capital firms joined by their common interest in the development of therapeutic
compounds to cure disease.132 These diverse entities share a desire to resolve uncertainty over
the challenges they face collectively. To a large extent, network enforcement of these inter-party
understandings is purely relational, relying on a combination of reputation, repeated dealings and
tit for tat reciprocity.133
What are the factors that cause these bio-tech networks to form and then sustain
themselves? In the context of rapid technological development, research breakthroughs are so
broadly distributed that no single firm has all the capabilities necessary for success. Research to
produce further technological advances requires collective collaboration designed to pool the
broadly dispersed information of a large number of firms.134 Thus, periods of rapid change
stimulate a variety of collaborative behaviors aimed at reducing the inherent uncertainties
associated with novel products or markets through the sharing of private information that
benefits each firm in its own pursuits.135 Despite the absence of formal rights and obligations
internal to members of the network, the evidence suggests that the forces that govern cooperation
are durable, with trust and cooperation increasing with participation in the network. When there
is a recognition of common interests and a high probability of future association, parties are more
likely to cooperate and also willing to punish defectors.136 Cooperation is a continuing strategy
rather than a one-shot calculation; networks use a reputation for cooperation and trustworthiness
as a guide to future interaction.137 At the level of the network community, there is a kind of
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mutualism or normative integration. This community level mutualism is both self-maintaining
and self-enforcing.138
b. Network Collaboration and Normative Integration of Novel Families. The research
on collaborative business networks offers lessons about how novel polygamous families can
overcome their initial isolation, affiliate with similar groups with compatible norms and, over
time, develop and signal their identity with the larger community. The key elements in
successful network collaborations are 1) the pursuit of a shared purpose through exchange of
private information; 2) collective recognition of the value of individual collaborators’
performance; 3) the adherence to norms of cooperation that advance the collective purpose; and
4) the capacity of outsiders to gain membership in the network by developing a pro-social
reputation.139 These elements support the prediction that as polygamous families evolve, they
will form social networks around their common interests to advance their purpose of attaining
social and legal recognition.
In the case of novel families, these network communities predictably emerge in response
to the uncertainties associated with their shared vulnerability as social and legal “outsiders.”140
Consider how a community of polygamous families might evolve from the collaborative
contracting stage discussed above. As the number of families’ increases, they become aware of
similar aspiring families with common interests and relational patterns as well as a common
purpose of obtaining social acceptance and legal recognition. They also understand that informal
affiliation (and ultimately formal organizations) can provide social support and reinforcement of
their own relationship goals and assist them in attaining their social and political goals.141
Today, this process likely can be facilitated by the internet, which provides a low-cost means to
connect and interact with other polygamous families.142 The emerging community is reinforced
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by interactions and information sharing that is more extensive and frequent than interactions with
others outside the community, to whom polygamous families remain outsiders.143
Theory and evidence from other settings predict that as a network of polygamous families
forms and mobilizes in pursuit of their common interests and goals, collective family
commitment norms emerge, together with norms of cooperation, reciprocity and
trustworthiness.144 The emergence of shared norms, enforced by the network community,
strengthens each polygamous family’s commitment to fulfill family functions, creating a
feedback effect that reinforces the norms that isolated polygamous families sought to establish
through collaborative contracting.145 The normative structure of the network thus serves the dual
functions of stimulating the emergence of norms of cooperation in relation to one another as well
as reinforcing commitment norms in individual families. These norms of family fidelity are
powerful behavioral regulators, reinforced through expressions of approval and informal
sanctions such as gossip, shaming and exclusion.146 They are also durable because they enhance
the willingness of members of the community to collaborate to achieve their common purpose.147
The final step—the normative integration of novel polygamous families into the larger
social community and their acceptance as fully functioning families—is one that is less well
understood. Among the theories that have been offered, the literature on social movements offers
insights about this process, at least as applied to some aspiring family categories.148 Prominent
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legal scholars have analyzed identity-based social movements, in which individuals in legally
disadvantaged groups have organized in pursuit of public acceptance, political recognition, and
civil rights.149 The marriage equality movement, for example, is part of a larger social movement
by gays and lesbians to attain equal citizenship. As William Eskridge explains, collective action
was stimulated by the designation of sexual orientation as a legally salient trait and source of
discrimination.150
Although collective action by aspiring families is the foundation of their normative
integration into the larger society, theory suggests that committed leaders, or norm entrepreneurs,
will play a key role in mobilization to attain public acceptance.151 These network leaders
facilitate normative integration by creating organizational contexts for coordinating people and
resources, and by developing strategies to utilize the media and other outlets to spread
information about the successful functioning of polygamous families.152 Given that the ultimate

See note 151 infra. See also Michael McCann, Law and Social Movements: Contemporary Perspectives, 2 Ann.
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goal of the polygamous family group is legal recognition, and that some level of public
acceptance is a predicate to attaining that goal,153 it seems likely that norm entrepreneurs in this
context will organize formal interest groups and use legal tools in pursuit of the community’s
goals; predictably lawyers often will perform the function of norm entrepreneurs.154
Scholars studying cultural change shed further light on the social integration process,
documenting how outsider groups, once affiliated, can signal their identity with and become
assimilated into the larger cultural community.155 The theory of identity signaling developed by
economists studying changing social behaviors seems to fit the evolutionary process by which
novel families become integrated into the larger society.156 Researchers have studied how
cultural conventions and behaviors function as symbols of identity, communicating aspects of
individuals or groups to others in the social world.157 Normative behaviors gain meaning, or
signal value, through their association with groups or similar types of individuals. The
normative identity that polygamous families or other novel families signal is based on their
family relationships of long-term commitment to mutual care and support; thus the essential
elements of this identity are similar to those of established families.158 The society at large
associates successful commitment norms with established families, and comes to recognize that
polygamous families successfully perform familial functions, although their behaviors and
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identity may not mirror precisely those of marital families.159 This process of identity signaling is
advanced in part by advocates (and perhaps litigation strategists) who, by serving as norm
entrepreneurs, accelerate the process of social change. As the cohort of novel families grows,
public awareness of their identity increases as well, and if the identity signaling is successful,160
a cascading process of changing social attitudes follows, culminating in public tolerance or
acceptance.161
Research on the mechanisms that produce social change also aid us in formulating
predictions about this last phase of norm integration. Jonah Berger documents a process of
change occurring when an idea, cultural view or attitude spreads contagiously through
continuous observation and word of mouth.162 This happens typically when the idea is associated
with images or narratives linked to “arousal emotions” such as anger or love163 and when the
behavior is observable and public.164 In our context, identity signaling by novel families can
have this effect. For example, consider the narratives of committed gay and lesbian couples,
often with their children, that became familiar during the campaign to extend marriage rights to
these couples.165 Berger’s research suggests that these positive images may have played a key
role in generating relatively rapid changes in public attitudes.
The process of identity signaling does not proceed seamlessly: it imposes costs on
polygamous families, especially in the early period. Successful signaling and normative
integration depends on families’ willingness to sacrifice some privacy, as public familiarity and
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acceptance can only happen if polygamous families are open about their relationships. To
varying degrees, identity signaling exposes the family to the risk of negative public reactions,
ranging from curiosity and skepticism to hostility and outrage. For some novel families
(including polygamous families), the costs are likely to be high, including the risk of criminal
sanctions for living together as families.166 Predictably, aspiring families will be reluctant to
incur onerous costs. In this situation, some exogenous shock that increase costs on continuing
their closeted lives may serve as a catalyst, motivating novel families to bear the initial costs of
living openly.167 Over time, as the public becomes familiar with the nature of novel family
relationships, the hope is that acceptance grows and hostility dissipates.
* * *
Although our model proceeds in three discrete stages for analytical purposes, the
collaborative process through which polygamous families seek to gain public acceptance
overlaps substantially with the group’s effort to attain legal recognition. First as we have
discussed, novel families and their advocates pursue their legal goals in part by signaling their
identity with established families, assuring the public about the quality of their relationships.
Second, as we discuss below, regulators are likely to extend legal protections through an
incremental process that allows state actors to gain information about the aspiring family
category. The incremental extension of legal rights has feedback effects that also contribute to
public familiarity and acceptance, while at the same time minimizing backlash that might follow
from full recognition of unfamiliar groups.168 Moreover, legal recognition in itself powerfully
signals legitimacy that, in turn, contributes to growing public acceptance of novel families. 169
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4. Resolving the Verifiability Problem through Collaborative Regulation
a. Legal Certification to Guard against Uncertain Risks. Even if the novel family
category gains social tolerance or acceptance (and success is certainly not guaranteed), the state
independently has an interest in verifying that these groups will function effectively for all of
members before it certifies the category as a legal family. But here the state faces a significant
information problem: family behavior is private and thus resists efforts to verify the quality of
family functioning, especially when (as with polygamous families) there is little by way of
historic experience. Some types may appear to perform family functions satisfactorily but create
latent risks affecting some members that are not immediately apparent. For example,
polygamous family groups may appear to provide care and support to members harmoniously,
but experience over time might reveal difficulties maintaining equality norms and avoiding
exploitation.170 (Indeed, it is plausible that groups lacking the qualities of well-functioning
families might organize to pursue social acceptance and legal recognition through fraudulent
means, a stratagem that time likely would reveal.171) Time might also reveal that conjugality
serves a key bonding function for unrelated adults and, as a consequence, intergenerational and
voluntary kin groups may turn out to be fragile, thereby jeopardizing dependent members.172 To
be sure, these particular risks may not materialize, but the general point is that the state will
demand sufficient information to mitigate latent risks as part of the process of determining
whether a novel family category should receive family status and the societal benefits and
resources that follow.173 The network of polygamous families, in turn, has an interest in
providing information that assures the state that this category meets the state’s expectations for
family functioning.
Several challenges may arise. Some aspiring groups may deserve legal recognition as
fulfilling family functions but be difficult to evaluate because they are based on unconventional
commitments or appear to be continuing the process of evolution. Other groups may face
community) and discussion in note _ infra. For a review and critique of this literature, see Scott, The Limits of
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unusual political obstacles, despite their apparently effective functioning, that impede full
recognition as families. Thus, the state must seek to understand the context in which the aspiring
family group functions; in doing so, lawmakers are likely to proceed with caution, perceiving
that once rights are extended, they will be difficult to withdraw. For some groups, an iterative
process may be appropriate, one in which the legal rights and responsibilities are assigned
incrementally, allowing the state to monitor family functioning over time in the process of
certifying family status.174 For other aspiring family categories, particularly those that are truly
novel, a collaborative approach may also require joint efforts by the state and the group to
establish a standard of best practices that are policed informally by the network itself.
b. An Iterative Approach. The state can verify and certify the family status of an aspiring
family type in several ways, including judicial recognition on constitutional grounds, state
legislative enactments, and administrative regulation. For some family groups, such as
cohabiting couples or (perhaps) multigenerational groups, the risk of exploitation and instability
may be relatively modest because the aspiring family is modeled on a familiar form. For these
groups, full family status can be attained through a straightforward iterative process, with rights
and obligations extended to the group incrementally.175 Through this collaborative process, state
actors acquire information informally about the quality of the family commitments over time,
allowing the state to verify that family functions are being performed satisfactorily. 176 For
example, if the state creates a family status with some relationship rights and privileges, it can
acquire information comparing dissolution rates to divorce rates.177 Moreover, the iterative
process may have a feedback effect, with the limited family status expediting public acceptance
of the novel group as “real” families. Eventually, the state’s monitoring function recedes as the
174
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new family category stabilizes and ultimately attains full legal recognition. This iterative process
provides greater certainty for the parties and for third parties dealing with the new families and
enhances the privacy and freedom of individual members of the recognized category to pursue
their relationship goals without external monitoring.178
c. Joint Mitigation of Risks through “Best Practices” Collaboration. For novel groups
that pose substantial informational and\or political challenges, the state may require a more
formal collaborative process in conjunction with an iterative approach. For polygamous family
groups, for example, uncertainty is high because there are no models for family behavior or
tested responses to the possible risks that may arise from certification of the group. In this case,
the state may turn to a more interactive collaboration to enunciate and enforce “best practices”
that mitigate those risks. Here the goal is to encourage common efforts by the polygamous
families themselves to create binding commitments that minimize the risk of perceived harm.
Once again we invoke a commercial analogue—one that at first blush may seem quite
remote from the realm of novel families. Leafy green vegetables pose particular risks because
they are often eaten raw and, today, often sold in “salad mixes” that mingle greens picked in
different locations, thus expanding the possibilities for cross contamination.179 Following an
outbreak of illness, California designated an authority to establish safety standards or “best
practices” for the farms from which member handlers buy.180 These standards require growers
and processors to identify hazardous control points and report the measures undertaken to
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is governed by a thirteen-member board, chosen by the state Secretary of Agriculture from nominations by the
membership. Twelve must be representatives of the handler-members of the organization; the thirteenth is supposed
to represent “the public.” California Marketing Agreement, id. at art. III.
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mitigate the hazard.181 Inspectors from the California Department of Food and Agriculture
monitor compliance,182 but the ultimate sanction for noncompliance is suspension or withdrawal
of a recalcitrant member’s right to use a service mark, and thus temporary or permanent
exclusion from the industry is enforced informally.183
The success of this “best practices” approach offers a regulatory prototype for the
mitigation of harms from legal recognition of some categories of novel families where a more
formal process of information-sharing and monitoring is warranted. Such a collaboration has
four key elements: 1) creation of a formal association of aspiring families in the high-risk group;
2) information exchange between the group (or its representatives) and the state to establish best
practices; 3) monitoring by the state to ensure that the group complies with those practices; and
4) informal enforcement by the association through shaming or exclusion.184 In the case of
polygamous families, risks that might attend the recognition of multiple-party family types
include the exploitation of minors and other “minority” interests or harms caused by instability
of the family relationships. Problems such as these can be addressed through a collaborative
process in which the aspiring families provide information to the state about the context in which
they fulfill their family functions, the parties collectively establish benchmarks that embody their
expectations for the support and care of all family members, and the families collectively seek to
promote compliance with the benchmarks.185 Through mechanisms such as this, the state, as it
incrementally extends rights, can certify well-functioning family categories subject to a
regulatory scheme tailored to their needs but serving the general goals of facilitating wellfunctioning family relationships. Thereafter, as with marriage, deference to family privacy will
181

The LGMA additionally requires each handler to maintain records that permit identification of the farm and field
from which all components of its products originate in case contamination is later discovered. California Marketing
Agreement, supra note --, art. V. See generally, Cal. Leafy Green Prods. Handler Mktg. Bd., Commodity Specific
Food Safety Guidelines for the Production and Harvest of Lettuce and Leafy Greens (Jul. 22, 2011, available at
http://www.caleafygreens.ca.gov/sites/default/files/LGMA%20Accepted%20Food%20Safety%20Practices%207.22.
11.pdf. (provisions that impose record-keeping requirements on signatory handlers).
182

Id.
The handler members, in turn, commit to deal only with farms that comply with the standards. California Leafy
Greens
Handler
Marketing
Agreement,
(Jan.
27,
2007)
available
at
www.caff.org/policy/documents/lgph_agreement.pdf. There are other private standard setting and certification
regimes, such as GlobalGAP (for “good agricultural practices”), an organization formed by major European
retailers; and a private international organization, the Global Food Safety Initiative assesses certification regimes in
accordance with a set of meta-standards.
184
Gilson, Sabel & Scott, Contract and Innovation, supra note – at 210-213.
185
In Part IIIC, we discuss how polygamous groups can adopt a best practices regulatory framework.
183
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translate into minimal state involvement for any individual family that is licensed so long as the
family is intact.
d. The licensing of individual families. Once a novel family type is certified, a
registration or licensing system, analogous to marriage licensing, provides a means by which
individual families in the novel type can obtain the formal status. This mechanism sets out
simple, clear rules that authorize licensing of all families that qualify under the certified
category. The registration process has a number of benefits: It provides public acknowledgment
of qualifying family categories, signaling that recognized relationships fulfill important social
functions. Further, registration embodies commitment in a concrete form, reinforcing family
commitment norms.186 Licensing is also a means by which the legal obligations and rights that
attend the status are clearly defined and assigned, providing security and certainty to family
members through post-dissolution enforcement with modest administrative and judicial costs.187
For example, if formal family status confers on polygamous families a right to share property
with other family members as it does for married couples, individual families by registering can
avoid difficult proof problems that are likely to accompany contractual enforcement.188
Registration reduces the risk that exploitative individuals will succeed in enjoying the benefits of
family relationships while avoiding reciprocal obligations (as sometimes happens in informal
unions).189 Finally, and importantly, a formal licensing process protects family privacy by
avoiding intrusive inquiries to determine whether an individual family embodies the qualities
that justify family status, another cost that informal families must bear.190
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The public signal of family status reinforces social norms by resolving any uncertainty the community may have
had about the nature of the relationship.
187
Licensing avoids error and administrative costs that regulators face when they seek to evaluate individually the
claims of informal aspiring families. It also protects family privacy. See note 188 infra.
188
See Elizabeth Scott, Implied Contracts, supra note _ at_ (describing the difficult proof problems faced by
partners in informal unions seeking to enforce contractual understandings). See also Ira Ellman, Contract Thinking
was Marvin’s Fatal Flaw, 76 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1365 (2001)(describing poor enforcement).
189
Id. The ALI Domestic Partnership status creates marriage-like obligations between long time cohabitants, but has
not been adopted by American states. ALI, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION SECT. 6:06-6.06
(2000). See also Robin Fretwell Wilson and Michael Clisham, American Law Institute's Principles of the Law of
Family Dissolution, Eight Years After Adoption: Guiding Principle or Obligatory Footnote?, 42 Fam. L.Q. 573, 590
(2008) (describing failure of states to adopt ALI Domestic Partnership Principles). Some European countries, as well
as Canada and Australia, have sought to mitigate these problems by expanding legal protection to cohabitants and
their children. SEE POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE, at 111-120, supra note --.
190
When parties in non-marital families seek legal recognition of their family status, an individualized inquiry often
requires parties to provide decision-makers with intimate information about their relationship, living arrangements
and intentions. See, e.g., Braschi v. Stahl Associates Co., 74 N.Y.2d at 213 (1989) (supporting the judgment with
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* * *
One challenge to the iterative approach we propose is that the evolutionary process
toward full legal protection could have the effect of limiting the options for family formation if
fully licensed families supplant other less comprehensive forms. In this vein, marriage critics
have expressed concern that same-sex couples will be channeled into marriage as an exclusive
status that crowds out other forms of legal protection.191 We acknowledge this risk but, as
suggested below, we do not think that the iterative approach necessarily is incompatible with
policies of recognizing more limited family relationships.192

III. FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE: THE WAY FORWARD FOR NEW FAMILIES
The model developed in Part II describes in stylized terms the discrete stages of an
evolutionary process by which novel family groups can use collaborative techniques to overcome
the uncertainty that otherwise impedes legal recognition. In this Part, we turn our attention to
real world contexts in which the stages of relational novelty, isolation and non-verifiability are
largely overlapping and thus less sharply delineated. In Part IIIA, we show how the movement
toward recognition of marriage rights for gay and lesbian couples has successfully deployed
collaborative strategies in an evolutionary process that is broadly consistent with the model we
describe in Part II.193 Part IIIB examines, in contrast, the somewhat puzzling failure of families
evidence of the parties’ living arrangements over time, daily schedules, joint bank accounts, life insurance policy
beneficiaries, in addition to other typically private information). In contrast, the acquisition of a marriage license
automatically confers the rights and obligations of family status and allows the defines the group freedom to arrange
their lives as they wish without oversight and monitoring by the state. See Case, Marriage Licenses, supra note _
(pointing out the freedom that married couples enjoy). Marital obligations are not formally enforced in intact
relationships, but provide the basis for property division and support after divorce. Presumably the same approach
would be applied to other registered families.
191
See e.g. Katherine Franke, Marriage is a Mixed Blessing, NY Times, June 23, 2011(op ed arguing that New
York’s recognition of same-sex marriage may lead to abolition of domestic partnership status and rights of de facto
family members).
192
See discussion of options for limited family status, such as Colorado Designated Beneficiaries statute, in Part
IIIC2b infra.
193
Of course, ours is one of many possible accounts of the marriage equality movement. Constitutional law scholars
have focused on the impact of the LGBT social movement on constitutional culture. See Jack Balkin and Reva
Siegel, Principles, Practices and Social Movements, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 927, 948 (explaining how the LGBT social
movement challenged settled constitutional practices as violating anti-discrimination principle ); William Eskridge,
Channeling: Identity-based Social Movements and Public Law, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 419 (2001)(describing politics of
recognition through which gays and lesbians (and other identity groups) employ equal protection principle to gain
majority rights).
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based on informal cohabitation to attain legal recognition. We suggest that the complexity and
variety of these relationships pose daunting information problems that have inhibited
collaborative affiliation, normative integration and legal recognition. In Part IIIC, we focus on
relationships not involving dyadic intimate pairs, including polyamorous, multi-generational and
voluntary kin groups. These aspiring family groups cannot be measured as readily against the
template provided by marriage. Thus, they pose more complex governance issues than does the
standard two-party union, and that may create challenges for the state in evaluating family
functioning. The collaborative framework we developed in Part II highlights both the challenges
and the opportunities for achieving a legal status facing these truly novel family forms.
A. SAME-SEX FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS: FROM OUTLAW TO MAINSTREAM
The modern history of gay and lesbian family relationships conforms roughly to our
account of how a novel family category evolves from outsider status to full integration and legal
recognition.194 Through the 1980s and well beyond, many (perhaps most) gays were closeted,
hiding their sexual orientation and intimate relationships from family, friends and colleagues to
avoid harsh social and legal sanctions. But even in this hostile environment, couples cohabited
in long-term unions195 and developed clear understandings of their mutual obligations.196 Samesex couples in committed relationships began to execute contracts to formalize their
understandings regarding property sharing, support, inheritance and related issues.197 Over time
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To be sure, the path to recognition of marriage rights for LGBT couples does not precisely follow the stylized
three-stage process we describe. But the overall pattern largely tracks the course we describe. Two landmark
Supreme Court decisions dramatically mark the change in status we describe. In 1986, the Supreme Court in Bowers
v. Hardwick upheld the constitutionality of a state statute criminalizing the sexual intimacy between gay men. 478
U.S. 186 (1986). Twenty seven years later, In United States v. Windsor, the Court struck down Section 3 of the
Defense of Marriage Act on the ground that excluding same-sex couples married under state law from the federal
definition of marriage offended the dignity of their relationships. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
195
MARY MENDOLA, THE MENDOLA REPORT: A NEW LOOK AT GAY COUPLES (1980) (recounting survey of
hundreds of same-sex couples in the 70s and 80s). See also e.g., Anne Hull "Just Married, After 51 Years Together;
Activist Gay Couple Accepts Leading Role." WASH. POST., Feb 29, 2004. p. A.01 (describing life of gay couple
together for over 50 years); Glenn Chapman, Being Gay in America: a 50-year Love Story AFP, available at
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iBphZRCRncTYPkQT_xk9Kseegng?docId=CNG.feaf99808e07209bf669127e7046e006.bd1 (May 8, 2014)(same).
196
George Chauncey’s history of the movement describes gay partners exchanging vows in marriage ceremonies
performed in the Metropolitan Community Church in the 1970s and 1980s. GEORGE CHAUNCEY, WHY MARRIAGE?
THE HISTORY SHAPING TODAY’S DEBATE OVER GAY EQUALITY 91-92 (2004).
197
See, e.g., Whorton v. Dillingham, 202 Cal.App.3d 447 (App. Dist. 1988) (upholding oral contract between samesex partners in which one promised to provide financial support in exchange for emotional support and household
services); Posik v. Layton, 695 So. 2d 759, 760 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (upholding written agreement between
same-sex partners); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 784 N.Y.S.2d 918 (Sup. Ct. 2004) (upholding agreement between
same-sex partners that decided division of property upon termination of relationship).
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these couples and their advocates, motivated by a common goal of attaining respect and legal
protection for their relationships, increasingly formed networks through their social, political and
religious affiliations.198 This movement contributed to greater openness about sexual orientation,
stimulated media interest and increased public familiarity with, and acceptance of, same-sex
family relationships. In recent years, advocates have sought and won legal recognition of these
unions through an incremental process, culminating in the largely successful (and ongoing) effort
to obtain marriage rights.
1. Contract and Commitment.
Throughout the 20th century, gays and lesbians faced intense public animus. Until quite
recently, polls showed that most Americans thought same-sex intimacy was immoral;199 social
and religious conservatives in the 1980s even suggested that AIDS was God’s punishment for
sinful behavior.200 Some states had criminal anti-sodomy statutes aimed at gays, until these laws
were ruled unconstitutional in 2003.201 Discrimination in employment, housing and education
was rampant and gays and lesbians received little protection under anti-discrimination laws.202
Not surprisingly, in this environment many LGBT individuals chose not to publicize their sexual
orientation or their intimate relationships, a stance that in many settings prevailed into the 21st
century.

198

The movement from isolation to broad societal acceptance is generally seen as starting in the 1950s with the
Mattachine Society, a group of gay men in Los Angeles who wanted to create social acceptance for LGB people.
JAMES T. STEARS, BEHIND THE MASK OF THE MATTACHINE 147 (2006). Disagreements within the group about what
methods should be used eventually led the group to disband. C. TODD WHITE, PRE-GAY L.A. 18–19 (2009)
(discussing initial disagreement about purpose and mission of Mattachine). The modern LGBT rights movement is
then seen as having started with the Stonewall riots in 1969. SAM DEADERICK & TAMARA TURNER, GAY
RESISTANCE: THE HIDDEN HISTORY 39–40 (1997).
199
From the 1970s to the early 1990s, polls showed that between two thirds and three quarters of Americans thought
gay sexual relations were “always wrong.” That percentage dropped to 44% by 2010. Tom Smith, Public Attitudes
toward Homosexuality, Nat’l Opinion Research Center (2011) at www.norc.org M. Jones, Americans' Opposition to
Gay Marriage Eases Slightly, Gallup Politics (May 24, 2010), http://www.gallup.com/poll/128291/americansopposition-gay-marriage-eases-slightly.aspx.
200
Hans Johnson & William Eskridge, The Legacy of Falwell’s Bully Pulpit—A Commentary by William Eskridge
’78 (last visited 4/19/2014, 11:05 AM), http://www.law.yale.edu/news/5131.htm.
201
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down Texas sodomy ban as unconstitutional). Some states still
have these laws in their criminal codes, but do not enforce them against consenting adults. See, e.g., Va. Code Ann.
§ § 18.2-361 (2005).
202
The first nondiscrimination law for LGBT people was passed in Massachusetts in 1981; the next was passed 8
years later. David E. Newton, Same-Sex Marriage : A Reference Handbook 21 (2010), available at
http://site.ebrary.com/lib/columbia//docDetail.action?docID=10437171. These laws generated strong opposition and
efforts to repeal. Ultimately the Supreme Court intervenes in Romer v. Evans to prevent repeal of these laws. 517
U.S. 620 (1996).
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Despite this hostile climate, many gays and lesbians found partners and cohabited in stable
unions in the last decades of the 20th century.203 Functioning in isolation from the larger society,
and often from family, friends and colleagues, same-sex couples constructed their relationships
in a highly uncertain environment in which they lacked legal protection and often social support.
The evidence suggests that many same-sex couples had clear understandings of their mutual
obligations to care for and support one another, and to share income and property. Despite
stresses unfamiliar to straight couples, these couples were able to sustain stable relationships on
the basis of these understandings,204 Some couples in supportive communities signaled their
marriage-like commitment to one another through wedding ceremonies205 even though neither
regulators nor (often) family recognized their commitments.206
The understandings of same-sex gay couples in committed relationships during this period
can be seen as analogous to collaborative agreements in the business setting. These early
cohabitation agreements were experimental endeavors worked out under conditions of high
uncertainty. In this environment, collaborative commitments served to guide normative behavior
and to build the trust and confidence that reinforces committed relationships. But even couples
who exchanged marriage vows well understood that their commitments were not legally
enforceable. By the 1990s, however, courts began to apply equitable remedies in cases where
one partner had exploited the other in a grossly unfair manner. Thus, for example, some courts
imposed constructive trusts on property held in legal title by one cohabitant where the other had
invested large amounts on improvements in reliance on the relational understanding.207 These
judicial responses resemble the limited enforcement of collaborative contracts by courts seeking
to deter blatant cheating on the commitment to collaborate.
203

Many relationships have become familiar through litigation, the media and historical accounts and cases. See,
e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (holding multi-decade lesbian relationship must be recognized
under federal law); Glenn Chapman, supra note -- (describing fifty year relationship); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. &
DARREN R. SPEDALE, GAY MARRIAGE: FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE? 251 (2006) (describing 40 year relationship of
Jack Baker and Mike McConnell) ; Braschi v Stahl Assoc., supra note -- (11 years).
204
Id. See also generally MENDOLA, supra note -- (providing in-depth qualitative interviews with same-sex couples).
205
See note _ infra.
206
See CHAUNCEY, supra note -- at 99 (discussing pattern during AIDS crisis of hospitals and regulators favoring
biological family of LGBT patient over partners without legal relationship). See also, e.g., In re Guardianship of
Kowalski, 478 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) Kowalski was prevented from seeing her partner injured in a
severe car accident by her partner’s family for several years, until a Minnesota appeals court found her to be the
lawful guardian of her partner.
207
See, e.g., Cannisi v. Walsh, 831 N.Y.S.2d 352 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006) (holding lesbian partner “articulated a
colorable claim for a constructive trust on the proceeds of the sale of the subject property”).
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Over time, as our collaborative model predicts, some cohabiting couples began to execute
formal agreements creating mutually enforceable property rights. Although courts first enforced
agreements between cohabitants in the 1970s, few early cases involved same-sex couples. But by
the 1990s, courts began to enforce contracts between gay and lesbian partners that specified
mutual financial obligations and understandings.208 Indeed, cohabiting same-sex couples
probably were (and are) more likely to execute formal contracts than their straight counterparts
because contract provided the only means by which same-sex couples could secure some of the
rights and obligations that automatically follow from marital status.209
2. Political Action, Public Acceptance and Normative Integration.
By the 1980s and 1990s, the number of lesbian and gay families increased and the need for
legal protection and political advocacy became more pressing. Scholars agree that two
developments during this period -- the AIDS epidemic and the lesbian baby boom -- motivated
social and political actions that had far-reaching consequences.210 A critically important element
of this process was the formation of networks by couples and advocates aiming to promote the
rights of couples in same-sex relationships, in part through strategies that increased acceptance of
gay and lesbian family life in the larger society. 211

208

See e.g., Doe v. Burkland, 808 A.2d 1090, 1094 (R.I. 2002) (“[I]t is not illegal for two men to live together, much
less to contract and to enter into partnerships with each other while doing so.”) See also cases cited in note ---, supra.
209
Couples who are not able to marry or enter civil unions frequently execute contracts regarding support, property
sharing, inheritance, custody rights, guardianship and other matters. Although estimating the number of such
agreements is speculative, in 1995, it was estimated that 10% of same-sex couples had written relationships
agreements. Margaret F. Brinig, Domestic Partnership and Default Rules at 278, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY,
supra note _(reporting study). Some websites and legal documents encourage same-sex couples to execute written
agreements, especially in states where they lack other means of legal formalization. See, e.g., Model Cohabitation
Agreement for Domestic Partners, http://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/estate-elder/b/estate-elderblog/archive/2010/10/05/model-cohabitation-agreement-for-domestic-partners.aspx (Oct. 5, 2010 10:31 AM); See
HRC Sample Domestic Partnership Agreement, available at http://www.hrc.org/files/assets/resources
/Domestic_Partner_Agreement.pdf [on file with the authors]. Even where gay couples marry or enter civil unions,
they may execute contracts out of concern that other states will not recognize their status. See generally Karel Raba,
Recognition and Enforcement of Out-of-State Adoption Decrees Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause: The Case
of Supplemental Birth Certificates, 15 Scholar: St. Mary's L. Rev. & Soc. Just. 293 (2013).
210

George Chauncey identifies the AIDS epidemic and the lesbian baby boom as the key catalysts stimulating the
marriage movement, CHAUNCEY, supra note -- at 95-111. See also NeJaime, supra note – at 102 (“The HIV/AIDS
epidemic brought countless gay men out of the closet, united lesbians and gay men behind a common cause, and
profoundly shaped the organization of the LGBT movement.”).
211
See CHAUNCEY, supra note -- at 41- 42 and 47(describing mobilization of gays, with large numbers coming out to
friends, workmates and families in the late 1980s and 1990s). David E. Newton, Same-Sex Marriage : A Reference
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The AIDS epidemic was a traumatic, exogenous shock that played a powerful role in
triggering the process of social and legal reform because it provided stark evidence of the
vulnerability of committed same-sex relationships when partners were required to engage with
society’s institutions. First, AIDS patients who lost their health insurance because they were too
ill to work were not eligible for family coverage on their partners’ plans.212 Moreover, when gay
and lesbian individuals contracted AIDS (or, indeed any serious illness or disability213), their
partners often were prevented from participating in treatment decisions, acting as proxy medical
decision-makers, or even from planning funerals and memorial services, often despite decedents’
express wishes.214 Surviving gay partners had no inheritance rights; in the absence of a will (and
sometimes even with one), parents, siblings and even more remote relatives acquired the
deceased partner’s property.215 In response to the plight of patients and their partners, the gay
and lesbian community rallied, uniting in ways that reinforced its cohesiveness, and an energized
corps of legal advocates mobilized to assert their rights.216 The AIDS crisis effectively motivated
collective action and provided a foundation for a powerful interest group aimed at gaining
protection of same-sex couples’ family rights. Despite the onerous cost of living openly, the
stakes had become sufficiently high that more couples were willing to take the risk.
In the last decades of the 20th century, this drive for legal protection gained momentum from
another source as well. Lesbian (and some gay) couples began to form families and to have and
raise children, usually biologically related to one partner and often produced through sperm

Handbook 23 (2010), available at http://site.ebrary.com/lib/columbia//docDetail.action?docID=10437171 (noting
the growth of LGBT organizations in the 1980s, leading to the emergence of the marriage movement ).
212
See Chauncey, supra note 234 at _.
213
The case of Sharon Kowalski, supra note -- also had a galvanizing impact, as it made clear how little protection
gay partnerships had. See CHAUNCEY, supra note -- at 111-116.
214
William B. Rubenstein, We Are Family: A Reflection on the Search for Legal Recognition of Lesbian and Gay
Relationships, 8 J.L. & Pol. 91 (1991-1992) (“AIDS has made the lack of a legal relationship crushingly apparent to
lesbian and gay couples: a gay man whose partner is dying of AIDS may have difficulty inquiring about his
condition or visiting him in the hospital because the couple has no legal relationship to one another.”).
215
See, e.g., Matter of Cooper, 592 N.Y.S.2d 797, 800 (1993) (rejecting same-sex partner’s claim to be “surviving
spouse” for the purpose of inheritance).
216
See CHAUNCEY, supra note -- at 41-42. See also Tina Fetner, How the Religious Right Shaped Lesbian and Gay
Activism 55 –56 (2008), available at http://site.ebrary.com/lib/columbia//docDetail.action?docID=10274273.
(“Lesbians, though not afflicted by AIDS in large numbers, were on the front lines of [AIDS response]. . . . In
dealing with this tragedy, the gay and lesbian community . . . established close networks of organizations working
toward common causes.”).
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donation (or surrogacy arrangements).217 This trend in itself indicated the growing desire of
same-sex couples to live together in committed family relationships, that of necessity could not
function in complete privacy. But these families faced daunting legal challenges unknown to
different-sex couples. The partner who lacked a biological connection with the child enjoyed no
parental rights.218 If the legal parent died or became incapacitated, her parents or other relatives
were likely to gain custody; despite having lived for years in a parent-child relationship, the
partner became a legal stranger to the child.219 Further, if the parents separated, the nonbiological parent’s relationship with her children continued only with the consent of her former
partner.220 Even biological parents lacked secure parental rights as courts in some states were
prepared to find lesbians to be unfit parents on the basis of their sexual orientation. 221
The growing interest among gays and lesbians in forming family relationships, together with
increased awareness of how vulnerable these relationships were, became a catalyst for collective
action, conforming roughly to the collaborative processes we describe in Part II. During the last
decades of the 20th century, same-sex couples increasingly affiliated through social, political and
religious networks, strengthening bonds within the gay community.222 Commitment ceremonies
grew in popularity and religious couples underwent non-legal marriage ceremonies before
friends and family in supportive churches.223 Committed same-sex couples, together with their
children, formed the basis of a normative community of families that provided social support to
one another.224 Particularly with the abolition of anti-sodomy laws criminalizing same-sex
217

Melanie B. Jacobs, Micah Has One Mommy and One Legal Stranger: Adjudicating Maternity for Nonbiological
Lesbian Coparents, 50 Buff. L. Rev. 341, 391 n.2 (2002) (citing report that as many as ten million children in the
U.S. live in families with same-sex parents).
218
Id. at _.
219
Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 321 (1993) (observing that mother’s partner’s custodial claim was
vulnerable, should mother die, even though mother designated her as child’s guardian in her will); T.F. v. B.L., 813
N.E.2d 1244, 1254 (2004) (rejecting custodial claim of former female partner of biological mother with no
biological relationship to the child).
220
Jacobs, supra note _ at _.
221
Divorced or unmarried custodial mothers were vulnerable to challenges by fathers or other relatives claiming
that lesbian mothers were unfit. In a much publicized Virginia case, Sharon Bottoms, a lesbian mother, lost custody
to her mother. Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102, 108 (1995) (awarding custody to grandmother on ground that
“conduct inherent in [mother’s] lesbianism is punishable as a Class 6 felony in the Commonwealth..”)
222
See discussion of role of AIDS crisis in promoting network formation among gays, supra notes -- to --.
223
See Chauncey, supra note _ at 91-92; James N. Birkitt, MCC & Marriage Equality, Metropolitan Community
Churches (last visited May 8, 2014), http://mccchurch.org/overview/history-of-mcc/mcc-and-marriage-equality/
(describing early Metropolitan Community Church marriage ceremonies).
224
See AMANDA K. BAUMLE ET AL., SAME-SEX PARTNERS 84–91 (2009) (discussing reasons that LGBT people
interact and may choose to live in predominantly LGBT neighborhoods). The formation of social community began
even before the catalyst of the AIDS crisis triggered a more activist approach. See e.g. Katherine Turk, "Our
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intimacy,225 these families also began to live more openly in their communities and had more
interaction with straight neighbors, teachers, and others, who thus could observe their
conventional character.226
The common goal of securing legal protection for gay and lesbian family relationships was
critically important at several levels. First, it served to reinforce cohesiveness within the gay
community, with a growing network of same-sex couples and their legal and political advocates
collaborating on a common set of political and social objectives.227 As with the formation of
collaborative business networks, this network was supported by the shared goals and common
purposes of its members. A norm of cooperation and open exchange of information among
network members was essential to the effective pursuit of legal reform. But the evidence
suggests that the reform movement served as well to solidify family commitment norms.
Beginning in the 1980s with the effort to persuade localities to pass domestic partnership
ordinances offering limited protection to gay couples, the clear strategy of the advocates who
emerged to lead the political and legal movement (the norm entrepreneurs) was to define the
relationships of same-sex couples as being like marriage and not like those of different-sex
couples who chose not to marry:228 Advocates described same-sex couples seeking relationship
recognition as being in committed, financially dependent unions like their married counterparts.
Thus, the state’s decision to exclude these couples from benefits that married couples enjoyed

Militancy Is in Our Openness": Gay Employment Rights Activism in California and the Question of Sexual
Orientation in Sex Equality Law, 31 Law & Hist. Rev. 423, 432–33 (2013) (describing the early formation of social
networks among gays and lesbians, together with organizations such as the Mattachine Society and the Daughters of
Bilitis in the 1950s). See discussion in note _ supra.
225
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)(finding criminal statute prohibiting sodomy unconstitutional).
226
Much evidence supports that positive attitudes follow when straights have personal association with gays. See
discussion in note 233 infra. Surveys show that after 2000, the percentage of the population that had personal
relationships with gays increased dramatically.
227
See Fetner, supra note -- at 46.
228
Douglas NeJaime, supra note _ makes this point in describing the strategy of advocates seeking to acquire
domestic partnership status for same-sex couples in Los Angeles and San Francisco in the 1990s:
“[T]o achieve nonmarital recognition, advocates appealed to marriage's conventions, pointed to the unique
exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage, and stressed same-sex couples' commonality with married
couples. In building domestic partnership, they emphasized marital norms–such as adult romantic
affiliation, mutual emotional commitment, and economic interdependence–capable of including same-sex
couples. By challenging marriage's primacy while arguing for recognition in terms defined by marital
norms, advocates contested, accepted, and ultimately shaped the institution of marriage while
simultaneously portraying same-sex relationships as marriage-like.” Id. at 113.
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was unfair discrimination.229 This strategy, in effect, both defined the norms for same sex family
relationships and encouraged conformity to those norms as the means to attain the community’s
legal goals.230
The movement to gain legal protection of same-sex family relationships also contributed
importantly to the transformation of public attitudes about these relationships and ultimately
about same-sex marriage. To be sure, changes were not immediate. Although the AIDS
epidemic awakened in the gay community a realization of the importance of legal reform, public
anxiety about AIDS in the 1980s seemed to intensify hostility toward gay and lesbian
relationships.231 But, on our view, collaboration within the community on political and legal
goals and consensus about the means to achieve them contributed both indirectly and directly to
public acceptance of same-sex relationships.232 The success of the marriage equality movement
required effective engagement with mainstream society. In part, this happened informally as
more lesbian and gay couples came out, signaling the quality of their relationships to the straight
community; in turn, that community became familiar with same-sex couples living together
(often with their children) in conventional family relationships. Research studies clearly indicate
that personal association with gay and lesbian individuals as friends, family members,
colleagues, and neighbors is strongly correlated with positive attitudes and support for marriage
equality.233 Coming out by gays and lesbians dispelled the fears held by many straights: two
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adults raising their children in a loving and supportive family was hardly a threatening image.
The softening of public attitudes, in turn, made it easier for lesbian and gay families to live more
openly, further reinforcing the trend toward public acceptance.234
The strategies of legal and political advocates and the behavior of gay and lesbian couples
who became the public face of the marriage equality movement also were critical to the process
of changing public attitudes. Advocates understood their role as norm entrepreneurs and chose
their clients carefully;235 most petitioners had compelling histories of long-term committed
relationships.236 In various ways, advocates, petitioners and other couples highlighted by the
media signaled to the larger community the marriage-like quality of same-sex relationships.237
The clear message was that if gays and lesbians were actually allowed to marry, couples that
chose this option could be expected to conform to stablilizing family norms embraced by the
larger community. Media reports confirmed that the desire of gay and lesbian partners to
undertake formal commitment through marriage was motivated by the same sentiments and goals
as those of straight couples. As Edie Windsor, who successfully challenged the constitutionality
of DOMA’s exclusion of same-sex spouses from federal benefits, 238 famously remarked,
“Marriage is this magic thing. It symbolizes commitment and love like nothing else in the
world.”239 Eighty -four year old Windsor and the story of her decades-long relationship with
Thea Spyer became world famous; Time magazine named her a runner-up as the 2013 Person of
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Pew Research Ctr. A Survey of LGBT Americans, 44 (2013), available at
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2013/06/SDT_LGBT-Americans_06-2013.pdf. (92% of LGBTs say society is
more accepting of them than a decade ago, attributing change to individuals knowing and interacting with LGBT
persons, the efforts of advocates and to LGBT couples raising families).
235
See NeJaime, supra note -- at 88 (describing strategy of emphasizing marriage-like quality of gay relationships as
contrasted with unmarried straight couples).
236
See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Gay Marriage at the Supreme Court: A ‘Real Couple’ Behind Prop 8 Challenge,
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the Year.240 On our view, the success of the marriage equality movement owes a great deal to the
impact on public and lawmakers’ opinion of the stories of petitioners such as Windsor, without
which it is unclear whether the powerful legal arguments made on their behalf would have
succeeded.241
This account of the gay and lesbian movement to attain marriage rights tracks the
evolutionary process from isolation to integration described in Part II. Couples and their
advocates collaborated in forming normative communities with the common aim of gaining
social recognition and legal protection of gay and lesbian families, and these networks reinforced
and supported their family relationships. Partly through the strategies of advocates, same-sex
couples signaled effectively to the larger community that they lived in conventional, marriagelike relationships, caring for each other and for their children. This process has led to a dramatic
shift in public attitudes; by 2013, a majority of Americans approved of marriage rights for samesex couples.242 In many parts of the country, the social status of committed same-sex couples
has evolved in a generation from that of isolated outsiders or even outlaws to families who are
integrated into the broader normative community.
3. Incremental Progress toward Legal Recognition
Although the stages of the collaborative process we describe in Part II are usefully
separated for analytic purposes, we would expect the networking-social-acceptance stage and the
legal-recognition stage to overlap substantially; this overlap has certainly characterized the
marriage equality movement. As we have explained, the realization that same-sex unions were
legally vulnerable directly led to the creation and strengthening of LGBT networks. Moreover,
signaling the marriage-like qualities of same-sex family relationships which contributed to social
acceptance was partly a legal strategy; the evidence suggests that this signaling furthered legal

240

Eliza Gray, Edith Windsor, the Unlikely Activist, Time (Dec. 11, 2013) http://poy.time.com/2013/12/11/runnerup-edith-windsor-the-unlikely-activist, supra note _; see also Adam Gabbatt, Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer: 'A
Love Affair That Just Kept On And On And On', (June 26, 2013), available at
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/26/edith-windsor-thea-spyer-doma (describing relationship).
241
Roberta Kaplan, attorney for Edie Windsor, described the importance of Windsor’s personal story to the success
of the constitutional litigation. Columbia Law School Commencement address, May 22, 2014 (on file with the
authors).
242
See Lydia Saad, In U.S., 52% Back Law to Legalize Gay Marriage in 50 States, at
http://www.gallop.com/poll/163730/back-law-legalize-marriage-states.aspx _(Gallop poll showing majority support
for marriage rights).

57

claims and reassured lawmakers as well as influencing public opinion.243 Finally, the extension
of legal protections has had a powerful expressive effect, legitimating gay relationships and
reinforcing positive public attitudes.244 In the past decade, of course, the dynamic synergy
between evolving public attitudes and legal reform has been extraordinary.245
Incremental progress toward full legal recognition of same-sex couples’ family
relationships began in the late 1980s and continues today. In the early period, LGBT legal
advocates enjoyed limited successes; a few courts recognized gay or lesbian couples as de facto
families for particular purposes,246 and cities such as New York and San Francisco allowed gay
and lesbian couples (and sometimes others) to register as domestic partners, a status that carried
symbolic meaning but few benefits.247 In the mid and late 1990s, a handful of state legislatures
enacted laws creating registration systems that conferred a somewhat broader array of rights and
benefits.248 Following the Vermont Supreme Court opinion in Baker v State in 1999, several
states enacted civil union statutes allowing same-sex couples to register for a status that closely
mirrored marriage in its tangible benefits and obligations, but lacked its respected status.249 In
2003, the Supreme Court held anti-sodomy laws unconstitutional in Lawrence v. Texas,
243
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removing a major obstacle to safe family formation for same-sex couples.250 Thereafter,
beginning in 2003 with the Massachusetts case of Goodrich v. Department of Public Health,
courts and then legislatures have extended the right to marry to same sex couples.251 Today
nineteen states recognize this right.252
This account is familiar and need not be repeated in detail. For our purposes, three
aspects of the regulatory history are important. First, as predicted in the model set out in Part II,
the process was iterative, allowing lawmakers to gain information incrementally about the
functioning of same-sex unions to determine whether these groups provided the stability and
capacity to fulfill family functions. In this way, lawmakers were able to meet the challenge of
verifying that an aspiring family group that had been the target of hostility and disparagement
deserved legal protection. Courts and legislatures evaluated the claim by marriage opponents that
children raised by gay and lesbian parents faced harms not experienced by children raised by
married parents—and therefore, these couples lacked the qualities to function adequately as
families.253 Evidence of same sex couples raising their children satisfactorily accumulated over
time, along with scientific studies indicating that the opponents’ claim was groundless.254 This
information greatly weakened the argument against extending the right to marry to gay and
lesbian couples since few disputed that, in the absence of particular harm, children benefited if
their parents were able to enjoy the benefits of marriage.255
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The second key feature of the process by which legal rights were extended to gay couples
suggests another way in which regulators and advocates collaborated to produce the information
necessary to evaluate this group of aspiring families. From the beginning, even when the rights
sought and conferred were meager, marriage has provided the template of best practices against
which both advocates and regulators have measured same-sex relationships. As Douglas
NeJaime demonstrates in his interesting study of LGBT advocacy in California in the 1980s and
1990s, advocates and couples argued consistently in different legal settings that same-sex unions
were marriage-equivalent and different from the casual affiliations of heterosexual couples who
chose not to marry.256 Moreover, lawmakers required, as a condition of even limited legal
recognition, that qualifying relationships be marriage-like. Under California domestic
partnership ordinances and statutes, for example, domestic partners were defined as two
individuals, not related by blood or marriage that “share the common necessaries of life,”257 and
“declare that they are each other’s principal domestic partner.”258 As NeJaime points out, the
language reflected an effort to define the responsibilities and commitment of domestic partners
as equivalent to those of marriage.259
Two important purposes were served by defining domestic partnerships as marriageequivalent. First, domestic partnership status provided same-sex couples with another and clearer
means of signaling the quality of their relationships, expediting the process of public acceptance.
Registration as domestic partners may have carried few tangible benefits, but the act announced
to the world that couples were in a committed interdependent relationship. Second, domestic
partnership and civil union registration have some similarity to the collaborative “best practices”
process described in Part II: The aspiring couples provided information to the state about how
they planned to fulfill their family functions, the parties collectively established benchmarks that
embodied their expectations for the support and care of family members, and lawmakers could
use domestic partnership registration by same-sex couples to monitor compliance with
advocates’ claims that many gay couples lived in marriage-like unions.260
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The third aspect of the process of legal reform that merits attention is the extent to which
lawmakers have conferred legal protection of same-sex relationships through registration and
licensing, rather than through judicial recognition of informal unions. Although de facto parents
have had some success in obtaining visitation rights in custody disputes, only rarely in the past
decade have courts and legislatures conferred rights and obligations on same-sex couples living
in informal unions. The ALI Domestic Partnership Principles, under which couples living in
informal unions are subject to the inter se rights and duties of marriage, has gained little
traction.261 Given the momentum toward greater legal protection of same-sex relationships, this
may seem surprising. But as we suggested in Part II, a licensing approach has many advantages.
Registration is an efficient and privacy-protective mechanism for resolving the daunting
verifiability problems faced by lawmakers aiming to offer family benefits only to those groups
that fulfill family functions. By allowing couples to signal that their relationship is based on
mutual commitment and responsibility, registration assists regulators in distinguishing unions
that warrant legal protection from more casual affiliations without costly probing inquiries.
B. THE INCOMPLETE RECOGNITION OF COHABITATION RELATIONSHIPS
Although LGBT advocates have enjoyed considerable success in attaining legal
recognition of same-sex family relationships, informally cohabiting couples in this country have
received few legal protections.262 Public hostility or ignorance about cohabitation cannot explain
the failure of lawmakers to confer legal protection on cohabitants; surveys indicate substantial
tolerance of informal unions.263 Yet many couples live together in marriage-like relationships
with few of the state benefits associated with marriage and without the obligations to one another
Of course not all aspiring families are modeled on marriage. This suggests that some novel family groups may face
different challenges as they seek legal recognition and that regulators’ may also need to adopt different verification
strategies to evaluate these groups. We address this issue below in Part IIIC.
261
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that protect spouses on divorce. Our analysis in Part I suggests that a liberal society should
confer legal protection on all groups that fulfill family functions satisfactorily. Why then have
same sex couples been so successful in attaining the legal benefits awarded to families while
cohabitants have largely been left unprotected?
Our analysis of the impediments facing aspiring families and the means of overcoming
these obstacles through collaboration sheds light on this puzzle. Two interrelated features of
cohabitation have impeded progress toward legal recognition and left cohabitants with few of the
legal rights and duties conferred on protected families. First, the category of cohabitants includes
a broad range of couples with varying intentions for their relationships. Some cohabiting
relationships are based on enduring commitment and interdependence; for psychological or
ideological reasons, these couples have chosen not to enter legal marriage.264 Other couples are
experimental and tentative in their commitment; they may or may not develop into long-term
family relationships. Still other cohabitants affirmatively reject commitment and financial
interdependence: Indeed, this is a significant reason not to marry.265 Of course, this variability
might describe gay and lesbian unions as well. But the difference, emphasized by LGBT
advocates, is the second feature of cohabitation that has complicated the path to family
recognition. The decision not to marry when marriage is an option sends a confusing signal
about the nature of cohabitants’ relationships, and the extent to which they are defined by family
commitment norms. This uncertainty impedes the sorting of those informal unions that serve
family functions adequately from more casual relationships that do not. The uncertain signal
created by the choice not to marry, together with the variability among cohabiting couples, has
hindered network formation and normative integration; it also poses challenging verifiability
problems for regulators. In short, the defining features of cohabitation as a category create the
uncertainty that has inhibited progress toward legal recognition.
1. Cohabitation and Norm Creation: Networking and Integration

264

Contractual claims for property and support are often brought by parties whose informal union was marriage-like.
See Friedman v. Friedman, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 892 (1993) (support claim by partner at dissolution of 25 year
relationship with 2 children rejected).
265
Id. See Judith Seltzer, Families Formed Outside of Marriage, 62 J. Marriage & Fam. 1247 (2000) (finding
differences between cohabitants and spouses).

62

Researchers have found that cohabitants have lower levels of commitment to their
relationships than do married couples;266 perhaps for this reason, informal unions typically are
far less stable than marriages. This is partly due, of course, to the diversity among cohabiting
couples described above. For many couples, cohabitation is experimental, a way for each
cohabitant to evaluate whether the relationship is viable and the other party a trustworthy and
compatible life partner. Thus, within three years, most informal unions either end or transition to
marriage. 267 Like same-sex couples, some different-sex couples may deal with the uncertainty
of their relationships by entering into collaborative contracts in the early experimental phase.
But as other scholars have noted, cohabiting couples infrequently execute formal contracts
regarding property sharing and future support: plausibly this is because many couples who
collaborate successfully see marriage as a superior option to formal contracting.268
Unlike the pattern observed among same-sex couples, there is little evidence that
cohabiting couples generally affiliate in normative communities that support and reinforce their
family relationships. This also is likely due to the variations among cohabitant relationships.
Couples who eschew commitment likely have little in common with those in long term marriagelike unions (who indeed may present to the community as married couples).269 Moreover, social
class plays a role in cohabitation patterns, with poor and less educated couples being more likely
to dissolve their relationships and less likely to marry before having children than those who are
more educated.270 This diversity likely deters the development of collaborative networks that
reinforce behavioral expectations promoting care and interdependence. Stephen Nock has argued
that, in contrast to marriage, cohabitation is “under-institutionalized,” lacking a strong set of
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stabilizing social norms.271 Consistent expectations for cohabitants’ behavior or goals would fit
poorly with the broad range of relationships in the category.
Nor do we find evidence that groups of cohabitants or their advocates collaborate to
further their common interest in attaining legal protection. Cohabitants experience most of the
legal disadvantages that same-sex couples have suffered: they are excluded from government
benefits conferred on married couples and other legal protections; moreover, absent contract, the
parties have few obligations to one another.272 Yet the response to these exclusions has been
relatively passive. To be sure, advocates for poor families, that include many cohabitants and
their children, seek generally to better lives strained by poverty. But these efforts focus largely
on improving child welfare and not directly on extending legal recognition to cohabitants.273 We
find no evidence of network formation aimed at extending legal protection to cohabitation as a
family category. Perhaps this is because the vulnerability of non-marital unions can easily be
remedied by marriage. Straight couples likely sometimes marry to avoid the frustration and
harms of non-marital status, even if their preference might be to continue to cohabitate. Those
cohabitants who do not marry must solve a difficult collective action problem if they are to
pursue legal recognition and protection of their non-marital families.
The process of normative integration into the larger community also has not proceeded in
a way that would position cohabitants to attain legal protection. The LGBT drive to attain family
rights was instrumental in fostering normative integration of same sex couples into the broader
community and in shaping public attitudes about the character of their family relationships.
Cohabitants are not subject to the hostility that same-sex couples endured; thus in some sense
informal families already enjoy public acceptance. But this does not translate into public support
for elevating cohabitants to the status of fully protected legal families. This is not surprising
since cohabitants have not signaled their commitment to family functioning norms. Instead, the
wide range of cohabiting relationships means that the signals are noisy: couples in casual or
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tentative relationships do not signal long term commitment while many couples in durable and
committed unions often do not announce their unmarried status at all.274
2. Cohabitation and the Verifiability Problem
Even if cohabitants formed networks to advocate for legal recognition of their families,
regulators would face difficulty in verifying cohabitation as a family category. The broad range
of cohabitants includes many couples that lack the qualities of well-functioning families but who
may seek family status with its benefits and privileges. Co-residency in an intimate union is
unlikely by itself to serve as an adequate basis for designating informal dyads as families, and
sorting couples in committed relationships from less deserving types poses a challenge for
regulators. Because informal unions lack the clear commitment signal provided by
registration,275 accurate determination of family status requires a costly factual inquiry that
threatens privacy276 and is prone to error. Courts have occasionally been willing to make these
determinations but typically it has been in situations where simpler mechanisms for signaling
family status are unavailable.277 As the lukewarm response to the ALI Domestic Partnership
Principles demonstrates, state actors resort only reluctantly to this ex post approach to
determining family status.278
Some cohabiting couples are clearly in family relationships, and regulators may be able
to employ a few straightforward proxies to minimize verifiability problems. For example,
biological parenthood could serve as a basis for creating family bonds between cohabiting
parents. Currently, unmarried parents living together have no financial or other duties to one
another, although both parents have substantial obligations to their children. The combination of
shared parenthood and cohabitation could function as a verifiable proxy subjecting the couple to
family obligations and entitling them to the benefits that legal families enjoy. 279 Cohabitants can
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also be classified on the basis of the duration of their unions. Most cohabiting couples separate or
marry in a few years: a couple who live together for five years or more can be assumed to be in a
marriage-like relationship, with the attendant rights and duties, unless they opt out contractually
from family obligations.280 Well-designed proxies such as these would allow regulators to sort
cohabitants in family relationships from those whose commitment (and social value) is less
compelling.
C. NON-DYADIC NOVEL FAMILIES: NAVIGATING NEW TERRITORY
Both same- and different-sex cohabiting couples are in intimate dyadic relationships, and
have been measured against a template based on marriage. For same-sex relationships, this
familiar model has simplified and facilitated normative integration and, ultimately, verification
by regulators of the qualities of couples aspiring to gain legal protection. Other aspiring
families, however, may lack ready models of family behavior to provide them with normative
guidelines or to assist others in evaluating their functioning. Polygamous, multi-generational, and
voluntary kin groups may all function as viable families, but to some extent they are pioneers
adapting behavior and structuring family obligations to suit their unique forms. To be sure, some
such families --such as multi-generational relationships—are familiar, but they have thus far
functioned informally without the goal of full legal protection.281 In general, these novel families
face the initial task of structuring their family relationships through experimentation and
adaptation without the template that marriage provides.
These groups are characterized by one of two features—some by both—that distinguish
them from families modeled on marriage. The first is that they often include more than two adult
parties.282 A group that includes multiple adults is more complex than a dyad in ways that
generate uncertainty about its functioning. Avoiding exploitation, imposing obligations fairly
and efficiently and protecting the interests of those adults who dissent from decisions by the
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adult majority require more complex mechanisms than is required to regulate an equalitarian
dyad.283 Second, while polygamous relationships involve sexual intimacy, other aspiring unions
are not based on conjugal bonds among the adults. The combination of multiple parties and
asexual relationships creates uncertainties about the stability and functioning of these novel
families that are different from, and possibly greater than, those families based on the model of
marriage. For multi-generational groups, of course, this uncertainty may be offset by genetic ties
and by historic tradition. But other non-dyadic groups may greater challenges in demonstrating
their viability as stable families.
1. Polygamous Groups
In the current climate, it may seem fanciful to discuss the path to legal recognition for
polygamous family aspirants. In contemporary American society, polygamy is largely associated
with fundamentalist Mormon communities and other notorious cultlike groups that are generally
viewed with hostility for posing a severe risk to teenage girls who reportedly are coerced into
sexual relationships with older men.284 On this ground, fundamentalist Mormons have been
subject to child protection interventions and their leaders have faced criminal prosecution.285
These groups are deeply hierarchical, with women occupying subservient positions in a maledominated oligarchy-- a family structure that is discordant with contemporary norms of gender
equality.286 Finally, because outlaw polygamous groups include a small number of (usually
older) men with many wives, young men are often expelled from their communities.287 It is fair
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to say that polygamous families are unlikely to attain public acceptance or legal recognition so
long as fundamentalist religious polygamists represent the archetypical model.
But attitudes toward polygamy appear to be softening somewhat, as evidenced by the
popularity of the television series, Big Love, and the reality show, Sister Wives, both depicting
rather conventional polygamous families.288 Further, the legal basis for prohibiting polygamous
families may be eroding. In 2013, in a case involving the family depicted in Sister Wives, a Utah
federal district court held unconstitutional a state criminal ban on polygamy.289 As the court in
Brown v, Buhman pointed out, fundamentalist Mormon men practicing polygamy typically enter
multiple religious marriages but have only one legal wife. On this basis, the court applied
Lawrence v. Texas to hold that the prong of the Utah bigamy statute prohibiting cohabitation by
a legally married person violated the individuals’ right of privacy protected under the 14th
Amendment.290 Further, the court found that the Utah law interfered with the free exercise of
religion in targeting a particular group. None of this indicates that polygamy has gained public
acceptance but it does suggest some change in public attitudes and a movement toward
decriminalization, an essential step in the process leading to legal recognition.291
Although some polyamorous groups may value the fluidity and liberty that parties in
unregulated relationships enjoy,292 others (such as the hypothetical polygamous family we
describe) might aspire to relationships based on commitment and interdependence.293 For those
in the latter category, family status may be a desirable goal, made more plausible by the success
288
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of the LGBT marriage equality movement.294 Aspiring polygamous families confront two
challenges, one common to multi-party adult relationships generally and the other familiar from
the LGBT experience. Like other families with multiple adults, polygamous groups aiming for
recognition must create governance structures that promote stability, while ensuring a fair
distribution of rights and obligations, without the guidance provided by the dyadic model of
marriage. In addition, like same-sex couples, polygamous groups face the formidable challenge
of moving from outlaw status to integration into the broader normative community. Moreover,
aspiring polygamous families must overcome a challenge not confronted by gays and lesbians—
the reputational harm created by the actual practices of fundamentalist polygamists.295
The first challenge for aspiring polygamous families is to create a collaborative
agreement sufficient to overcome high levels of uncertainty about the viability of this
relationship form. Multi-party contracting requires more complex governance structures than
does bilateral agreement.296 In addition to the challenge of specifying mutual obligations and
responsibilities, parties must structure their relationships and performance to avoid exploitation
of all members and also address the key question of how to resolve disagreements.297 Adrienne
Davis has suggested that this challenge can be met by adapting the default rules governing
partnership relationships.298 These rules protect dissenting members from exploitation by the
majority and permit exit from the partnership by dissenting minorities under specified
conditions.299 In addition, the parties can contract for a unanimity rule governing all family
decision-making. Here the threat of dissolution of the relationship should the parties fail to agree
on a course of action deters frivolous disagreements and encourages compromise. Under this
regime, parties are able to learn rather quickly whether their partners are capable of adequate
family functioning and whether they have the capacity for collaborative decision-making. Such
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an environment has been shown to create bonds of trust in commercial relationships based on
similar collaborative structures. The success of multi-party professional partnerships and other
commercial collaborations suggests that there are available models to solve the contracting
problems facing polygamous groups who wish to test the durability of their relationship through
contract.
But even if individual polygamous relationships can be sustained through collaborative
and formal contracting, these groups face a daunting task seeking to move from outlaw status to
integration with the larger normative community. Just as same sex intimacy was criminalized in
the pre-Lawrence era, (at least some) polygamous unions are often prohibited under criminal
law.300 For this reason, polygamous groups are likely to be secretive; as with same-sex couples,
this inhibits the formation of normative networks and, ultimately, acceptance by the broader
social community. Moreover, a powerful strategy deployed by LGBT advocates for gaining
public acceptance and legal reform, the identification of same sex unions with marriage, is likely
not available to polygamous groups. Further, stable commitment may seem to be incompatible
with the simultaneous maintenance of multiple intimate relationships; if so, polygamous
relationships may be perceived as offending the strong social norm against adultery.
But polygamists have been heartened by the LGBT movement, the success of which may
function as a catalyst that emboldens polygamist groups to live more openly and to pursue legal
recognition of their family relationships.301 If these groups function as stable, caring units in
which adult members relate to one another on the basis of equality and minors are not exploited,
polygamous families plausibly can signal to the larger community that they are committed to
family functioning norms. As with the LGBT marriage equality movement, a key element of this
process is the formation of networks of aspiring families and their advocates. Effective legal and
social advocacy by norm entrepreneurs on behalf of contemporary polygamous groups might
gradually supplant religious polygamists in the public imagination. Indeed, the process of
network formation has begun, facilitated by the internet, with the emergence of interest groups
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whose goal is promote interaction among polygamists, disseminate information to correct
negative impressions and ultimately acquire plural marriage rights. The web site of one such
group announces that “[f]reely-consenting, adult, non-abusive, marriage-committed polygamy is
the next civil rights battle.” 302
Polygamists face particularly daunting challenges in attaining state certification. Because
the form is not modeled on the familiar marital dyad and because of the sordid and familiar
recent history of polygamy, the state will require extraordinary assurances that these new
families are different from fundamentalist cults. Because of these unique obstacles, transparency
and cooperation with regulators will likely be essential. The model developed in Part II predicts
that an iterative process of collaboration to develop and enforce best practices offers the most
plausible path for polygamists to attain family status. To be sure, the goal of attaining marriage
rights for polygamists may currently seem unlikely, but Buhman and other recent developments
hint that the legal prohibition of and moral distaste for multi-party intimate unions is beginning
to erode. If so, polygamous groups may well be in the early stages of the evolutionary process
that leads to legal recognition.303
2. Non-Conjugal Aspiring Families
Aspiring non-conjugal families includes groups that are truly contemporary and those
that are quite familiar; both confront unique challenges in attaining legal recognition. Some
aspiring families, such as voluntary kin groups, have only recently attracted public interest and
attention.304 Others, such as multi-generational families, have deep roots in American society and
have been recognized by the Supreme Court as having constitutionally protected family status
for some purposes.305 Non-conjugal groups have some advantages as aspiring families. They
avoid the destabilizing risk of infidelity and, because their non-sexual bonds do not incite moral
disapproval, they are unlikely to stir public opprobrium. In this regard, the process toward legal
recognition may be smoother than that of same-sex couples or polygamous groups. But
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paradoxically, the absence of conjugal ties may generate skepticism about the durability and
stability of some non-conjugal affiliations. Because the legal family has long been modeled on
marriage, non-conjugal groups may need to overcome an implicit assumption that a sexual bond
reinforces family commitment between unrelated adults. Moreover, like polygamous groups,
multi-member non-conjugal family aspirants need to create governance structures that promote
commitment and avoid exploitation. Finally, some non-conjugal relationships (particularly
voluntary kin) fill important family functions, but the parties themselves do not expect the group
to satisfy the full range of dependency needs.306 In short, the evolutionary process whereby these
groups might acquire legal protection remains unclear.
a. Multigenerational groups. These obstacles may be least likely to impede legal
recognition of multi-generational families. Extended families have the benefit of both deep
historic roots and genetic bonds, ties that are assumed to form a solid basis of family
commitment. Indeed, until the 20th century, when the two-parent nuclear family became the
norm, multi-generational families predominated.307 The Supreme Court, in an opinion rejecting
the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance that prohibited a grandson from living in his
grandmother’s home, famously noted that extended families have played an important role in
American society for centuries.308 But despite the fact that multi-generational families are
recognized for some limited legal purposes,309 and generally are regarded favorably in the public
imagination, for the most part these families function informally and do not receive the legal
protection of marital families.
In part, this may be due to the complexity of extended families and uncertainty about
which genetic family members are, or should be, recognized as a legal family. A family with
multiple adults of different generations may include some who are eager to assume durable
family obligations in an extended family unit and others whose affiliations are more attenuated,
and who may prefer to form smaller units with non-family partners. Some members may reside
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with the group for a period and then depart. If legal recognition is justified for multigenerational groups with stable long-term commitments to provide mutual care, the state will
require a sorting mechanism –beyond genetic ties – to separate those members that fulfill family
functioning needs from those that lack either the willingness or the capability (or both) to fulfill
the familial role.
Probably the strongest candidate for full family status is the linear family group
composed of grandparent(s), parent(s) and child(ren). It is clear that this familiar type of
extended family can function satisfactorily to fulfill family functions. Further, the genetic bond
among the members, together with well-defined family roles, reinforces already existing norms
of commitment and caring. The primary challenge for these extended families may be the
creation of networks with other similar families to pursue their goals of increasing public support
and attaining official family status.310 More complex multigenerational groups pose a greater
challenge because they are less familiar to the public and less likely to be bound by family
commitment norms than are linear family groups. Partly for this reason, regulators may find it
more difficult to verify the family functioning of these non-conventional multi-generational
groups.
b. Voluntary kin groups. Voluntary kin groups have recently received media attention,
but generally they are relatively unfamiliar to the public and to regulators.311 In part, their
emergence can be explained as a product of deficits in the functioning of more traditional family
forms with the increase in divorce and decline of extended families in recent decades. Thus,
some groups of voluntary kin function as substitutes for marriage or other family relationships.
Lacking genetic or legal ties, members assume certain family roles and insist that their
relationships are not simply friendships.312 These groups can take many forms: variations
include two or more divorced or widowed adults, sometimes with their minor children; a parent
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who has lost an adult child and a younger adult who has assumed that role;313 and adult friends
who decide to live together, share resources and care for one another in a non-conjugal group.314
The latter affiliation may include retired seniors who decide to live together for mutual
companionship and support.315
In one sense, the path to legal recognition might be less difficult for these aspiring
families than for gay couples or polygamous groups because voluntary kin are less likely to face
public enmity. Moreover, in contrast to some relationships based on sexual intimacy, these nonconjugal groups are formed specifically (and solely) for the purpose of fulfilling family
functions.316 But voluntary kin groups have many varying goals and expectations about their
family roles. While some live as committed interdependent families, researchers report that in
many relationships the voluntary kin do not purport (or aspire) to satisfy the full range of family
functions.317 Sometimes the relationship is viewed as a supplement to other primary family
relationships. For example, lesbian parents may have a relationship with their child’s biological
father who plays an important role in the child’s life but does not assume other family
obligations.318 As with cohabiting couples, this variety predictably can impede the formation of
networks based on common interests and complicate the ability to signal the family-like nature
of the category. Of course, unlike cohabitants, committed voluntary kin cannot marry and thus
groups that do function fully as families predictably can signal their nature more effectively than
can cohabitants.
One issue raised by the possibility of assigning family status to voluntary kin and other
multi-adult family groups is whether the size of these groups is self-limiting. As we have
suggested, increasing the number of adults adds complexity and costs to family relationships,
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along with the risk of exploitation, shirking, and other potential harms.319 These risks may tend
to increase as members are added, with the result that only multi-party groups with relatively few
members are likely to function effectively in fulfilling family functions. Limitations on the size
of aspiring families that are able to qualify for legal recognition forestall the possibility that
communes or cult groups might register as a voluntary kinship family.
A final important question that we note but do not fully address is raised by the
heterogeneity of voluntary kin groups (and some multi-generational families), with many
fulfilling a limited range of family functions. Here the question is whether these limited purpose
relationships are likely to acquire legal recognition through the evolutionary process we describe.
To be sure, many individuals in voluntary kin relationships, like some cohabitants, prefer to
maintain informal ties. But others may desire legal enforcement of the particular rights and
obligations that they have assumed and seek protection of those family bonds.320 Suggestive
evidence of groups attaining limited family rights supports the plausibility of this outcome
through some variation of the process we describe. For example, grandparents have lobbied
successfully (with the assistance of AARP, a powerful interest group) to enact statutes that give
them standing to seek visitation with their grandchildren.321 Moreover, at least one state has
enacted a statute that allows couples to customize their family relationships by executing
“designated beneficiary” agreements in which each party chooses to extend particular rights and
protections to the other from a menu of options.322 It may be that the path to legal protection of
more limited family relationships raises fewer or different challenges than those faced by groups
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who aim to gain social and legal recognition as fully functioning families. But, in any event, that
analysis is beyond the scope of our project.

CONCLUSION
The past decade has witnessed a dramatic change in public attitudes and legal status for
same-sex couples who wish to marry. These events demonstrate that the legal conception of the
family is no longer limited to traditional marriage. At the same time, the lack of substantial
movement toward granting legal benefits to unmarried cohabitants is evidence that the state
remains committed to a welfarist criterion for granting legal status, one that embodies a
commitment to family functioning norms; as a category, cohabitants are too diverse to satisfy
this critereon. Viewed together, both of these developments suggest that other groups aspiring to
legal recognition as families must overcome substantial uncertainties if they are to achieve their
ultimate objectives. At the core, overcoming these uncertainties requires establishing trust at
every level — among the individual members of the aspiring family group, among the individual
group and other similar aspirants, and among the network of aspiring families, the larger social
community and the state. Collaborative processes have been shown in other settings to offer a
means for creating trust endogenously and thus appear to offer a way forward in the evolution of
other novel families. Moreover, collaboration was a crucial element in the successful movement
to achieve marriage rights for LBGT couples, and the absence of meaningful collaboration is one
factor in explaining the stasis that characterizes the status of unmarried cohabitants. This, then,
is the evidence supporting the prediction that the future progress of other aspiring family groups
toward legal status will depend in large part on how well they are able to engage the
collaborative mechanisms that smooth the path from contract to status.
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